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Date	Original Topic
24th February 2002	Barricades at Rorke's Drift - When were they built? By Martin Everett How about discussing the REAL thing. The merits of the films and the books have all been analysed in detail on this website, but what about the defence of Rorke's Drift itself. The popular story is no preparation for defending the post had been made and that all the barricades were hastily built in 2-3 hours after the news of the disaster at Isandhlwana reached Lt. Chard. I suggest was an impossible task in the time and resources available. Looking elaborate defences for the stores held at near by Helpmekaar, this strongly suggests that the Commissariat Store at Rorke's Drift was already strongly fortified before 22 January – standard operational practice (last line of defence). After news of the disaster was received, the small garrison, when realising they could not evacuate the sick, then fortified the hospital building and linked this Commissariat Store using the wagons and other available material.
Date	Replies
24th February 2002	John Young Martin, The 'elaborate defences' at Helpmekaar, were constructed after the events of Isandlwana, by Captain Walter P. Jones, 5th (Field) Company, Royal Engineers and his men. On the 22nd January, 1879, only a hastily established entrenched laager existed at Helpmekaar. As to Rorke's Drift; don't forget the N.N.C. under Stephenson, were there for some manual labour. Chaplain Smith, Walter Dunn, James Reynolds and a number of other participants had it that the barricade was constructed after receiving the warning from the Isandlwana survivors. John Young, Chairman, Anglo-Zulu War Research Society.
24th February 2002	Gary Laliberty Hi Martin, I think I understand what you talking about. 1) The 'post' was a supply depot on the border with Zululand. 2)The 'storehouse' Witt's church was packed from floor to ceiling with bags of mealies, and heavy crates of army biscuit, yet still there was enough left over to form two huge piles in front of the storehouse. I think this answers your question about resources availabe. 3)British's survivors,fugitves...whatever you want to call them, had been stopping at the post on there way to Helpmekaar, from the start of the battle at Isandlwana. Lt. Bromhead was at the post, Lt. Chard was down at the Drift, when the "official" news reached Lt. Chard at the drift. It was two men, Lt. Adendorff of the NNC and a Carbineer. The men when up to the post to consult with the officers there. Lt. Chard had found out that the news had been broken by a stream of exhausted survivors,who when on in the direction of Helpmekaar. 4)A full strenght infantry company consisted of 100 men however, "B" company had about 95 men available for duty that day. Now estimates of the number of black troops at Rorke's Drift vary between 100 and 300, well I go with the 100 men. Ordinarily a company of the Natal Native Contingent would consist of 100 men. So with about 200 to 400 men the barricades went up fast. Gary
24th February 2002	Martin Everett John, I was assuming a similar (entrenched) laager at Rorke's Drift as was constructed at Helpmekaar. It is difficult to believe that a forward supply depot was established without any consideration for its defence. My reference to Helpmekaar is based on newly discovered drawings by an officer of 1/24th.
24th February 2002	Dave Nolan Martin "It is difficult to believe that a forward supply depot was established without any consideration for its defence" LIke Chelmsford did at Isandlwana (not a supply depot, granted) , which was within enemy territory, you mean? Dave
24th February 2002	James Garland Martin, Chard's official report and his letter to Queen Victoria describe the defences in great detail. He describes how he set men to work loopholing the hospital and store and with the help of diagrams describes the mealie bag and box walls. He makes no mention of any entrenched positions but he does describe a long ditch outside the defences in the area of the kitchens. He doesn't elaborate on what this but it does not appear to have any defensive function. One account I have ( I can't remember which at this time) bemoans the fact that there wasn't time to clear the bush in front of the hospital, and that this provided cover for the Zulus throughout the fight. Bromhead had ordered the tents to be struck in order to provide a clear field of fire for the defenders. Now if any thought had been given to the defence of the post prior to the warnings given by the Isandhlwana survivors, surely the buildings would have already been loopholed, and the bush cleared. As for the piles of mealies outside the store I would suggest this was where they were placed by the defenders when emptying the store so that others could use them to build the walls. The walls i would suggest were not as high as the defenders would have wished before the attack was under way. The defenders were thinking on their feet as the battle raged. It was not for instance until the hospital caught light that it was thought prudent to remove the thatch from the store roof. James
25th February 2002	John Young Martin, If the newly discovered drawings bear any resemblance to the engravings that appear in 'The Graphic' of 29th March 1879 page 312, or 'The Illustrated London News' of 12th April 1879 page 336. Then it is post-22/1/1879. Should the artist for the drawings is Lieutenant William W. Lloyd, 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment, then see the engravings from his drawings that appeared in 'The Illustrated London News' of 29th March 1879. If that is the case, then the defences depicted are work of 5th (Field) Company, Royal Engineers. All that appears to have been at the Helpmekaar depot, prior to 22nd January 1879, were the two corrugated iron sheds, which were used for stores. (See 'The Red Soldier' pages 141-2, for Captain W.P. Jones's letter of 25th February 1879.) As to the N.N.C. being able to erect the barricades at a break-neck pace at Rorke's Drift, may be there was a certain element of coercion there with the comment made by R.J. (Bob) Hall, who states '...and stood over them while the laager was built under the direction of Mr. Dalton. ...' I conject the term 'stood over them' has all sorts of possible inferences; "do as you're told or else" or may be their labour was directed at the point of a gun? Just theorizing. John Young, Chairman, Anglo-Zulu War Research Society
25th February 2002	Martin Everett I am just suggesting that prior to the attack at RD and the news of the defeat at Isandhlwana rearched the mission station that there was a defence already around the Commissariate Store. This line of defence was indicated on Chard's own map - as the Last line of defence. Certainly considerable defencive work was untaken once the garrison realised that they would have to stand and fight, and importantly they could not move the sick and wounded.
25th February 2002	Greg King Did the centre column excpect any threat from the Zulu`s at Rorke`s drift?.At Isandlwana Lt Melvill noted to another officer that there were no picketts placed at the rear of the camp .This being over the border, I trully think that the attitude that "The whole thing would be other in weeks" was rife amongst all but a few of the British officers. And that those on the Natal border faced little or no threat.
25th February 2002	Greg In my above reply OTHER should read OVER. sorry.
26th February 2002	James Garland Martin, It is clear from the first hand accounts of participants that the walls were constructed from mealie bags and biscuit boxes. As this was a commissariat post their duty was to preserve and look after the stores entrusted to them. The last thing they would have done (before the news from Isandhlwana ) would be to expose these very stores to the elements by using them to construct walls. If any thought had been given to defending the post prior to 22nd January they would most likely have constructed the defences with stone from one of the two stone kraals in front of the post. Where is the evidence to suggest that there were defences already in place in front of the store. I've looked through all the first hand accounts at my disposal and can't find any. There is one clear piece of evidence that indicates that there was no defence outside the Storeand that is as follows. In Chards report to Queen Victoria he states that after the NNC deserted "I saw our line of defence was too extended, and at once commenced a retrenchment of biscuit boxes, so as to get a place we could fall back upon if we could not hold the whole" On Chard's map this line of biscuit boxes runs between the North and South walls to the west of the store. If there had already been a defensive work in front of the store this would have been completely unnecessary. Furthermore if thought had already been given to a defensive work around the store why would the store have been left unloopholed until the 22nd. Again in Chard's account he states "Sergeant Windridge showed great intelligence and energy in arranging the stores of the defence of the commissarriat store, forming loopholes etc." In Chards official report he states " Lieutenant Bromhead was most actively engaged in loopholing and barricading the store building and hospital " Padre Smith's Diary entry describes the topography and layout of the site prior to the battle and despite describing the kraal makes no mention of any defences in front of the store. Dunne's account contains the following " In about 2 hours a wall breast high had been made nearly all round taking in the hospital and store. When I went to look at the progress made at the former place, I saw that this was the weakest point, for there was nothing but a plank to close the opening at one part" He later goes on " Immediately they heard the shot our 300 natives took up their assegais and made off towards Helpmakaar, followed by their officer! Chard, seeing that we could not now hold the original line immediately had the space curtailed by drawing a row of biscuit boxes, two high, across the middle. This probably saved us later from destruction, for it afforded shelter for the men when they were obliged to retreat on the hospital being taken." If there had already been a defensive work in front of the store Chard would not have needed to form this wall. In one of Hook's accounts he states " Lieutenants Chard and Bromhead held a consultation , short and earnest, and orders were given that we were to get the hospital and storehouse ready for defence, and that we were never to say die or surrender." Why would they need to get the storehouse ready for defence if they had already done so. James
27th February 2002	John Young Re-my above comments regarding the defences at Helpmekaar. Charles Norris-Newman - "Noggs" states that it was a wagon laager around the stores, as does Conductor Foley, an Isandlwana survivor, in his report. For a transcript of their reports see Page 45 of 'The Red Book, Natal Press Reports, Anglo-Zulu War 1879', compiled by Ron Lock & Peter Quantrill. Norris-Newman's report also states the following fact regarding officers present at Rorke's Drift; 'The following officers were also with him at the time, and gave material assistance:- Dr. Reynolds 2-24th, Lieutenant Chard Chard, R.E., Lieutenant Adendorff, 1-3rd Natal Native Contingent...' Once again, from a contemporary source Adendorff appears as a defender. John Young, Chairman, Anglo-Zulu War Research Society.
1st March 2002	Mike McCabe There was an interim stage at Helpmekaar, begun on 22 January. By a curious quirk of fate, Colonel Hassard CB, the Commanding Royal Engineer (CRE) in South Africa, and Lt Baxter his Adjutant, had a very narrow escape from the Isandlwana camp disaster and Rorke’s Drift. As they belatedly moved up the LofC from Greytown to rejoin Lord Chelmsford's staff (having spent time expediting the forward deployment of 5th Coy RE, amongst other things) a wagon stuck in the road further delaying their journey to the British forward logistic base at Helpmekaar; otherwise their original route plan would probably (as it happened) have put them at the Isandlwana camp just in time to be massacred. Their renewed journey brought them to within an hour’s travel of Rorke’s Drift. Here they met fugitives who told them that the post was already lost and burning – which was only partly true. They had been overtaken by two companies of 1st/24th Foot on the way to reinforce Rorke’s Drift. On receipt of this same news their commander returned with his men, wagons and ammunition to Helpmekaar where a defensive laager had been rapidly constructed. So, the CRE returned there also and directed its improvement. The detail is covered in RE Journals for mid/late 1879, and can be seen in the RE Library at Chatham. How much more interesting the story might have been had the CRE arrived in time to take charge of the Rorke’s Drift defences! The full development of Helpmekaar's defences, ultimately including such elaborations as a drawbridge, was completed by 5th Coy RE main body during February 1879.Though we cannot now prove the detail, it is probable that the following members of the 5th Coy RE are buried at Helpmekaar, having succumbed to disease: Sapper H (Henry) Thompson, Died 28 February 1879;Driver W Beckett,Died 28 February 1879;Driver F (Frederick) MandyDied 6 March 1879. If anybody can cast light on this last detail it would be most helpful.The SAHRA BSU archives indicate that at least one of these men might have been buried at Rorke's Drift or even in Dundee.