you are currently viewing: Discussion Forum
 
 

 
 

The Rorke's Drift VC Discussion Forum
(View Discussion Rules)

** IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO ALL USERS **

PLEASE NOTE: This forum is now inactive and is provided for reference purposes only. The live forum is available at www.rorkesdriftvc.com/forum


(Back To Topic List)

DateOriginal Topic
10th July 2002John Chard - a private letter.
By John Young
I was trawling through my material in an effort to add something to the Spalding debate. When I checked the 'The Royal Engineer Journal' dated 1st September, 1879, there is an extract from a private letter from John Chard V.C. and Colonel Sir John Stokes, K.C.B., of the Royal Engineers, I'll quote the full text including the lead into the extract;

'The following extract of a private letter from Major Chard, R.E., to Sir John Stokes is interesting as showing that before Colonel Durnford arrived in camp at Isandhlwana, large bodies of Zulus were in movement to surround the camp, whilst all the officers of the force were out of camp, presumably with their men expecting an attack before Colonel Durnford arrived. This effectually disposes of the ascertation so often made, that this gallant officer brought on the attack. The Zulus were evidently making their dispositions for it, whilst Major Chard was watching them. It was his report of these movements that led to Colonel Durnford's subsequent arrangements:-
"I was at Isandhlwana on the morning of the 22nd; I took up the four men who had come up with me in consequence of an order received about 9 p.m. on the 21st. As I had received no orders as to myself, I got Major Spalding's permission to ride out to the camp and find out my duties, I did not see any officer in the camp. and on going to the tent where the orders were. found that I was to construct a work for the protection of the ponts to be manned by the Company 24th encamped there. While standing there I could see the Zulus on the crest of the distant hills, and saw several parties of them move so far to the left that they were concealed from my view by the Isandlhlwana hill, moving to a direction that would take them between me and Rorke's Drift. I rode back and, about a quarter of a mile from the camp, met Colonel Durnford at the head of his mounted men, the rest of his corps following; I rode back a short way with him telling him what I had seen, and by his direction took messages along his line on my way back, ordering Captain Russell's battery up at once and detaching a Company of Sikali men to protect the wagons. On reaching Rorke's Drift I reported what I had seen to Major Spalding, and the insecurity of the ponts with a samll guard of six men. The Company 24th not having arrived, although according to the orders it should have already been there, Major Spalding told me to commence the work when the Company arrived. It is this Company he went to Helpmakaar about; no one could account for its non-arrival. At this time we knew the camp was being attacked but no one had any thought of a disaster."


I have retained the original spellings and grammar as given in 'The Royal Engineer Journal'.

The question it provokes for me is, does the letter contain any further details? Does it carry on to mention anything about the Rorke's Drift action? If so has anyone seen the letter in question?

John Young,
Chairman,
Anglo-Zulu War Research Society.
DateReplies
10th July 2002Peter Quantrill
John,
Your report is very interesting and is similar in tone and context to the report written by Chard at the request of Queen Victoria,and submitted to Her on 21 February 1880.Both reports mention that Spalding was aware of a possible attack on the ponts,yet left his command to summons Rainforth.
I have yet to locate a report by Rainforth explaining the reason for his apparant disobedience of orders ( twice) The only explanation is that both orders failed to reach him which seens unlikely.
Can you throw any light John?
Peter
16th July 2002John Young
Peter,

Sorry I can throw any light on that, but I can cloud the issue further.

According to William Bellairs' 'Distribution of Troops in the Field, Natal and Transvaal, January 16, 1879.' Under the section entitled 'Line of Communications.' The line between 'Helpmakaar(sic)-Rorke's Drift' is under the command of 'Colonel [Edward William] Bray, C.B. 4F.' who appears to have at his disposal '4 Companies, 2nd Battalion, 4th Foot.' A document dated six days prior to the events of 22nd January, 1879, is giving incorrect information as to the troops positioned on the line of communications and their location. Strange?

John Young,
Chairman,
Anglo-Zulu War Research Society.
24th July 2002Peter Quantrill
John,
Have just looked at Spalding's " Journal of Military Operations in Natal and Zululand." dated 15 th February 1879. It would appear that neither Bray nor Hassard was at Helpmekaar on 22 January. Spalding states that he was on 22 January, "in temporary charge of the line of communication between Helpmakaar(sic) and no. 3 column" He further stated that that the reason for Rainforth's non appearance at Rorke's Drift was " owing to the miscarrying of the orders," whatever that may mean.
No reason to alter opinion of his conduct.
Peter
24th July 2002James Garland
Peter,
Are you suggesting that Spalding should have persevered in relieving Rorke's Drift in the face of almost certain destruction by the Zulus if caught in the open? British officers have always been expected to interpret their orders in light of the situation in which they find themselves. Although of course they are usually expected to submit their reasoning if they don't comply.
It is only rarely that orders to "hold at all costs" or "stand to the last man" are given. I would contend that Spalding gave his reasons for his decisions and they were accepted by his contemporaries. The British Commanders in the Zulu war were certainly not slow to critisise when they thought it appropriate eg Captain Carey, Lieutenant Harward etc. so they would hardly have held back if they thought Spalding was wanting.
What if Spalding had carried on to Rorke's Drift? He would have been caught in the open by a numerically superior force and if defeated left the way open to an invasion of Natal. With hindsight we know no invasion was planned but from contemporary accounts it was a real fear on the part of the British.
Lastly you refer to Spalding's "Journal of Military Operations in Zululand" could you tell me where the journal can be seen? Is it held at a museum etc. ,or has it been published?

James

18th June 2005Mike McCabe
Col Hassard arrived at Helpmakaar during the hours of drakness on the night of 22/23 January, accompanied by his Adjutant, Lt Baxter RE and a Sgt RE Clerk. They had been delayed en route by their office wagon overturning. Hassard's initial duties lay with Chelmsford's HQ, he being Commanding Royal Engineer (CRE) South Africa. Hassard initially pressed on from Helpmakaar towards Rorkes Drift, but (from detail, again in the RE Journal) met and returned with the Coy 24th that had concluded that RD was taken and burning. Hassard then was instruemental in improvising a defence at the Helpmakaar stores depot.
Had Hassard been less delayed, he might either have reached RD in time to participate in (and by imlication command) its defence, or even Isandlwana camp, where he would have outranked both Durnford and Pulleine. Perhaps lucky that he didn't. Hassard is often referred to as elderly and physically enfeebled. However, he appears to have shown great detemination in pressing on to Helpmakaar/RD. In the aftermath of Isandlwana he returned to his duties at the Cape, with a new RE command structure being improvised around the original RE Coy Comds - until the divisional structure formed for the second invasion led to properly apppointed CREs, with newly arrived RE Offrs providing small staffs. Interestingly, Capt Hime RE acted as Colonial Engineer throughout, intelligently anticipating requirements and compensating for Hassard's temporary isolaion at Helpmakaar.By the time of the 1899-1902 Boer War, Hime was Prime Minister of Natal and partly responsible for the influence brought to bear on Maj Gen WP Symons to base significant forces in the Dundee area, primarily intended to 'face down' the Boers and also deter attempts to seize the valuable coalfields - major source of the high quality steaming coal essential to the functioning of British controlled railways and the merchant fleet in that part of the Southern hemisphere.
MC McC