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Date	Original Topic
30th September 2002	Ammunition expenditure By Chris N Given that the Rorke's drift defenders got through a large amount of ammunition and the fact that the defenders must have killed many with the bayonet, why was the musketry at the defence so relatively ineffective ? In terms of quality if not quantity.
Date	Replies
1st October 2002	Bill Cainan Chris Good question. At Rorke's Drift B Company virtually fired off all their available ammunition, around 25,000 rounds, killing about 600 Zulus. This (very roughly) equates to 50 rounds fired for every Zulu killed. However, this is neither a reflection on the quality of the Martini-Henry rifle nor of the firing skills of the soldiers. This obviously leads to the question - well then, why the ratio of 1:50 ? I read somewhere that in Vietnam, the Americans were firing one million rounds for every hit achieved - how true that is, who knows, but is does illustrate a point ! It would be nice to think that every shot fired will hit, but this is not the case. Obviously many shots fired are AIMED with the firer trying to hit an individual. Whether he hits or not depends on lots of things. Is he moving ? Is the target moving ? Is the target moving towards the firer or away from him, or is the target movingr across the firer's front ? Is the target moving slow or fast ? Is the target standing or prone ? Is the firer tired ? Is the firer ill ? What is the weather like ? Is it day or night ? And so on ..... many factors can affect the chance of hitting, not least the range. Even on a firing range under"ideal" conditions with good optical sights, modern soldiers usually struggle to get over 50% hits. However, a lot of fire is NOT aimed and is done for different purposes, with killing the enemy being incidental: You can use rifle fire to deter an enemy, effectively putting up a "wall" of fire that you are daring the enemy to progress through. You can use fire to supress an enemy - keeping him pinned behind a wall or in a trench or in a ditch. You can fire for morale purposes, increasing your own morale and lowering that of the enemy. Rapid fire does give you a bit of a buzz ! You can fire for the purpose of bluffing the enemy into thinking that you have more ammo than you have ! So, there are many reasons for firing than just trying to knock down an individual. I believe that battlefield statistics show that the Martini Henry could expect to achieve 5% hits at ranges over 250 yards and 10% at ranges under 250 yards. This would then be reflected in the 1:50 ratio. However, it would be wrong to then infer that the musketry was ineffective. At Rorke's Drift the rifle fire from some 40 men at the south wall broke up the initial attack by the iNdluyengwe Regiment. In about 5 minutes they would have fired about a thousand rounds and killed about 80-100 Zulus. Although the iNdluyengwe had a strength of around a thousand, the casualties would have been concentrated on its 2 or 3 lead companies. Each of these lead companies would have suffered over 60% casualties, their morale would have been broken. The following companies would have taken the hint and swung away from the heavy fire. This is how musketry breaks up mass attacks - it's the damage you do to the LEAD units. A meandering reply, but I hope it goes some way to answering your question !!! Bill
2nd October 2002	Bill Power Chris,you've kicked a hornet's nest with this question! It is worhty of a course of study @ a military college! Bill has bravely stepped forward to iniate the problem with topnotch info!! First,I might suggest reading Chard's report to Queen Vicky,on this site! OK,numbers! Reported Zulu dead buried in the immediate area of RD-351,"many" found later in surrounding area-number?!- no-one knows ! Number wounded carried from fiekd? Again no info! Kill/wound ratio?! In WW1 it was 1/3,in WW11.1/8!! But a.303 British or a Mauser round was a different critter than a Boxer-Henry short chamber .450! Modern ammo,after the Hague Convention,are FMJ's-cased so they do not mushroom-Dum-Dum! The M-H was 92% pure lead.which shattered bone! The point being,if you were hit ,you probably died! Number of rounds fired has been estimated @ 16.000! Now,Chard reported that fire was opened @ 500-600yds.! If you have ever seen a M-H Mk11 or the upgraded Mk1[approved-the socalled 3rd Pattern].then you see the problem twixt 600 to 500yds.! The sights on a M-H are actually 4!! The peep[the leaf-slide being pushed to 500yds. on the ramp]for less than100 yds,. from 100 to 500yds.on a stepped ramp using the V-notch on the slidetop.600 & beyond,it was necessary to flip up the leaf & slide up the slide to engraved marks[hard thing at night] to 1300yds.,then a sight atop the leaf for 1400yds>! Given the rather"Curvey" trajectory of the 480 grain 'freight-train" that was giving the GoodNews to the Zulu @ only 1450fps,it is easy to see that failure to set the sights @ the correct range could cause a miss!! The "Lads" didn't pack Leica "Vector" range-finder nor was there any ajustment for windage-Ventometers came later! Rate of aimed fire?-12/min.! Brutal recoil caused the men to switch shouldes,even to resr the butts on the mealiebags!! Then,when the night action started,the muzzleflash was guarenteed to blind you!! Bill Power
2nd October 2002	James Garland Chris It is also possible that some ammunition was left behind when the hospital was abandoned.
2nd October 2002	James Garland Chris Please disregard my previous comment. I seem to recall a first hand account describing Surgeon Reynolds risking his life carrying ammunition to the hospital which tends to suggest they were short of ammo and therefore it seems unlikely there was any to leave behind.
2nd October 2002	Patrick Thomas But is there any official record of how many rounds were actually fired or even how much was there to start with? It seems to me the defenders themselves couldn't even agree on how much ammo/ boxes they had left at the end.
2nd October 2002	Bill Power Pat;-Chard states that every rifle had a full complement of rounds[60,I believe]! Plus 1&1/2 boxes remaining[900 rounds per box in 10 round paper packs tied with cord as per LoC]! Gotta believe this ,as he was one cool dude faced with probable further drama! Regards! Bill
2nd October 2002	Derek Johns from the books I have read, some zulus were shot two or three times. if 600 Zulus were killed at the battle, then would there be at lease 600-1200 wounded ? I also read that after firing a few rounds the Martini-Henry started to kick like a mule and after firing a rifle a few hours some of the soldiers all they did was to piont the rifle and shoot.
2nd October 2002	Ian Essex Chris, Perhaps the majority of the accurate shooting was done during daylight hours. A further massive expenditure of ammunition would have then taken place at night, with far less results.
3rd October 2002	Mike McCabe Don't under-estimate the difficulty of snap shooting at close range - especially when tired, under pressure, and not necessarily able to hold and aim properly in the optimum fire position. Point of aim and point of strike do not coincide well at short to medium ranges - even in fairly long barrelled weapons with iron sights configured like those of the Martini Henri. It is also quite a heavy weapon, not easily brought to the shoulder or pointed quickly by a tired man. Also, Chard refers to his defence having a good supply to hand on the early morning of 23 January (I do not recall the exact words of the February 1880 report) - inferring that the defenders had been replenshed. Possibly some 7,000 rounds or so were probably broken out into soldiers pouches and bandoliers and were probably counted as 'issued' rather than 'fired'. Once the soldier had them, they would normally stay with him, rather than be recovered back to the box. Moreover there would have been some losses as defenders drew back onto the final perimeter, and dropped rounds in hasty handling. It's also possible that several part boxes of rounds were just left behind as the perimeter shortened. The hospital's external defenders were driven away quickly and early from the extreme SSW tip of the wall. The internal defenders would not necessarily have picked up and carried with them any extra reserves issued to them in their initial firing positions - having other things to occupy their thoughts at the time. The ammunition poked through the window by Surgeon Reynolds may not all have been directly received into the hands of the internal defenders, and much of it might have been un-distributed as that part of the defence developed, and then collapsed. Some ammunition might just have been trodden into the ground.
3rd October 2002	Mike McCabe What I mean by my remark on point of aim, should be taken in the context of soldiers not necessarily being able to reset their sights to a suitable range, or aim off properly to take account of the range already set on the sight. Does anybody know the minimum range that could be set on the MH sight? Also, the aspect of the target offered for a snap shot could have been small and fleeting - especially at night. Side on illumination from the burning hospital would also create an optical illusion of the visible centre of the target mass being away from the actual centre. The individual defender would have many difficulties to face - mostly arising from being required to use his rifle in unfamiliar ways at unusually short ranges - considering how the weapon was normally intended to be fired, and how fire was normally intended to be directed and controlled. And, there would have been great risks to individual firers staying too long in holding and aiming positions, the target they were firing at was not necessarily the source of direct to them - which could have been another Zulu very close. Also, quick firing even approximately near an attacker would have a deterrent/prophylactic effect, and a fair proportion of expenditure would have gone this way.
3rd October 2002	Patrick Thomas Chard (1880) actually says "...each man had a GOOD supply of ammunition in his pouches, we had only about a box and a half left besides..." Sure I read somewhere that, possibly on this site, that Bourne later recalled each man starting with the standard 70 rounds and they had 34 boxes in reserve. After the battle they had just 6 boxes left. Does anybody know what the normal reserve should have been for 1 company strength ?
3rd October 2002	Howdy Stout This is an excellent question and is indeed a hornet's nest. From what I'm told, the defenders fired between 25 000 and 27 000 rounds over the course of 11 hours, 7 of those hours being in darkness. Only 351 Zulus were buried in a mass grave the following morning. A rough-and-ready calculation shows the defenders were averaging 2 500 rounds fired per hour. That averages out to between 18 and 25 rounds fired by each defender per hour. Obviously this is an average with some periods of intense activity and some periods of relative calm. My personal opinion is that there was heavy firing from the commissariat stores during the afternoon as the initial Zulu wave hit the hospital. This seems to be the fiercest part of the fighting as 11 of the 15 defenders killed died during the fight at the hospital. This is probably when the Zulus suffered their main casualties as well. As darkness fell, my guess is that the defenders were firing more or less at sounds, which have a tendency to carry in the South African veld. Not being able to see a very vocal opponent is a good reason to loose off a few shots. However, I think that during the night the defenders were simply firing blindly into the dark and that they hit very few, if any, Zulus because the Zulus weren't attacking during the night but only demonstrating. How's that for a hornet's nest?
4th October 2002	Phil Read Perhaps I can add a small point to Mike McCabe's excellent comments. I assume that bayonets were fixed for the majority of the battle. A Martini Henry with a fixed bayonet is over six feet long from end to end. The bayonet makes the rifle poorly balanced and difficult (for me at least!) to hold horizontal to the ground. I would imagine that even an experienced soldier would have difficulty aiming it accurately, particularly as fatigue set in.
4th October 2002	Peter Quantrill To go back to Patrick's question of the normal reserve ammo carried per company.Field Force Regulations issued by Chelmsford in November 1878, show reserve ammo of 200 rounds per man. This was over and above the 70 normally carried by the soldier. ( 20 in each pouch,and 30 in a ball bag slung across the shoulder) The Regulations show a theoritical coy strength of 107. In reality the coy strengths at Isandlwana numbered approx 80 all ranks. A significant point covering the ammo controversy was added to our book " Zulu Victory" in which we only located the primary source just prior to publication. This indicated that the ball bags were faulty and men lost ammunition when doubling into battle positions.This occurred at Kambula and Gingindlovuand. Major General Newdicate additionally wrote "Complaints were made about the ball bags; the weight of the cartridges made the bags open and when the men doubled the cartridges fell out." The positions taken up by the 6 companies of the 24th at Isandlwana required considerable doubling, thus resulting in much ammo being lost. Nobody survived to report this significant loss of ammo. Major Woodgate was equally condemning of the ball bag situation at the bayonet charge he led at Kambula."With the ball bags much ammunition was lost." This factor, previously unreported, may well have possibly played a significant roll at Isandlwana.
7th October 2002	Adrian Whiting Like many of the contributors above, I doubt the limitations on anticipated fire effect were the result of one single factor. The soldier was trained to undertake 5 rounds per minute when engaged in volley firing, 4 or less if smoke obscured the view. (Source for this is Musketry Instructions). An interesting feature of the commands for volley firing at that time is that the soldier loaded and set the sights on the command "at ....yards, ready", yet the only word of command to follow was "present", at which the rifle was brought to the shoulder, three beats of slow time counted, and then fired, aim having been taken if a target was available. This was altered in 1880 so that the soldier paused until a further command "fire" was given. Of course, there was no ready method of ensuring soldiers aimed at different targets... Independent firing was restricted since it is not simply a case of loading from the expense pouch continuously. The ammunition was supplied to the soldier in ten round bundles, secured by twine. Each had to be removed from the waistbelt ammunition pouches, be opened and emptied into the expense pouch or pocket. The bundles were obtained from ammunition boxes containing 600 rounds, the design of which has sparked much controversy ! The net effect of this supply route is to drastically lower the average rounds per minute that could be fired. Present day experiments have suggested that independent firing my produce a "burst" of fire for several rounds, perhaps 9 a minute, but that if this is averaged out, the rounds per minute average tails off considerably. There is little wrong with the action of the Martini in rapidity terms - modern target shooting can produce at least 20 accurate shots per minute (shooter prone with ammunition laid out - hits being achieved on a fig. 11 target at 200 yards). I would thus suggest that the apparently "low" fire effect occurred through a combination of fire for suppressive effect (as a contributor details above), relatively low rates of sustained fire (in comprison to what might have been expected), and very limited data on casualty numbers, and casualy type. Incidentally, it seems that recent archaeological evidence from Isandlwana suggests that a number of ammunition box tin lining handles have been recovered forward of the camp. The inference being that boxes were moved forward at some point during the action. The handles fit the recess in the MkIV and MkV ammunition box lids. My practical experience with the expense pouch has had the same result as the contributor above suggests - loss of ammunition.
7th October 2002	Patrick Thomas Thanks to Peter for answering the query about reserve ammunition. Presuming that B Company had their allotted 70 rounds each plus a further 200 per man reserve, I count about 82-85 men of B company, depending which roll you read, so in total they, B Coy., might have had + or - 22,950 rounds. I wonder if the other men of the 24th, be they 1st or 2nd battalion had more than their 70 rounds with them. Hospital patients would presumably have taken their arms and ammunition with them to hospital, but would they have taken more than the 70 rounds carried on their pouches/bags ? Sorry but how many rounds were there per ammunition box, we now have two answers, 600 or is it 900, both of which are given above?
8th October 2002	Bill Power FumbleFingered me! I intended to say about 900 rounds in 1 1/2 boxes! As per the Loc[List of Change] 2661 sealed on August 16 1873,there were 580 rounds/box! Also,if the handle ripped free of the tin liner,as has been reported,then removing the tin with a bayonet could have rendered some rounds useless,as the rolled foil cases were a bit soft! Then there was the inevitable [with blackpowder] stoppages- Further to a previous query,the minimum range on a M-H open sight.was 100 yards! The peep sight,with the leaf slide pushed up to 500yds,intended for less than 100yds ,obscures the sight picture-worth Sweet Fanny Adams!! With the sight set @ 100 yds,the M-H's POI[Point of Impact]was 6 inches higher than the POA[Point of Aim]! Another problem with the M-H Mk11,was the heat transfer through the brass pin attaching the foreend to the Knoxform block,scorching the hand! Yes,the rifle is front heavy with the bayonet fixed,but it gave superior reach
8th October 2002	Adrian Whiting Just to try and clarify the point about the number of rounds per ammunition box, the number was different for different Marks of box ! The mark I box was originally made for Snider ammunition, and could hold 480 Martini rounds (source is the LOC Bill mentions above, 2661). Subsequent marks of box, and the ones relevant for 1879 are the mark IV and mark V (introduced in 1871 and 1876 respectively) both hold 600 Martini rounds. LOC 2661does point this out for the capacity of the mark IV box, but makes no mention of the mark V, since it pre-dates it. I have an example of the mark IV box, complete with lid label, which indicates 600 rounds were once contained within - oh that they were still there now !, still the box is interesting enough in itself ! With reference to Patrick's question regarding hospital patients, I envisage that since the Company and Battalion ammunition reserve was boxed, the reserve ammunition would not have been issued to them when they departed for hospital. Assuming they carried their full valise equipment they would have had their personal ready issue of 70 rounds each, plus 10 rounds in one bundle in their valises. In any event I doubt that B Coy would have demured at resupplying them, and the other supernumeraries present. On a separate note I would be interested to know if the post held ammmunition beyond that of the Company reserve. Bill's points about sight setting concur exactly with my own present day shooting experiences. Interestingly, when the backsight leaf is raised, over 400 yards on a Mark II Martini, the resultant head position for aiming is less than ideal too. This may be one of the factors contributing to the reported tendency for the Martini's fire to hold the foe at about that distance or less, i.e. when the backsight was lowered at that range, it was easier for the soldier to aim more effectively. One final point for those interested in identifying 24th Martinis, both battalions were issued with the mark I rifle (source for this is the Regimental museum records), and upgraded these under local arrangements. The rifles in their use in 1879 were thus upgraded mark IIs rather than mark IIs per se, identified by offset "Mark II" stampings on the action body. Happy hunting though - the battalion markings were on the butt, and seem to have worn off most MHs these days !
11th October 2002	Bill Power Adrian,you are quite correct on the 600 rounds/box! Silly me was reading LoC 4756.sealed June 9 1885 for the drawn brass case used in the Mk111. Incidentaly,this weighed 80.5lbs.! Also,there was a rifling deflection issue with the Mk11 sights;they shot 3 ins to the left @ 100yds..later corrected on the Mk111's by offsetting the rearsight bed! So, the casual reader must conclude that M-H's were a POS[garbage]-! In fact,they were the supreme infantry rifle in the world! Compare it to the Chassepot or the the Springfield"Trapdoor"! This brings up the other issue-what type of war was this arm designed to fight?! A European war,where the opposition arrayed themselves in a field,hosed each other with artillery,marched [literally]elbow to elbow,popped of 2 volleys.then gave "em the"Brummagum"- a coloquiallism for Birmingham,the steel manufacture-ie,-the bayonet! This"dancing"had not changed for 200yrs. from Blenheim to the Crimea,but firepower had, since the invention of the Minie ball by Capt. Claude-Ettiene Minie,in1848! The effects were apparent in the US Civil War with the Burton ball,rates of accurate fire from a rifled musket able to hit out to 300yds,.changed the calculus of war! No longer 50yds from a smoothbore musket loading @ 3rds/min or a Baker Rifle @ 2! The infantry was still trained for volley fire @ massed formations!
14th October 2002	Adrian Whiting Bill, I think you are quite right to consider the environment the army intended to see action in, and in which to use the MH rifle. I think the principal aspect of this is more to do with the tactical doctrine. The army had considerable experience of differing adversaries prior to the introduction of a breech loader, and I think it was the European experience that primarily drove the decision to adopt a stop gap breech loading conversion before a purpose made arm was introduced - so yes, the arm was introduced to match tactical advances by European and American developments, but i think that the doctrine did not move on at the same pace. |A good example of this would be the lack of a separate word of command to "fire" - as I mentioned above. This omission flowed from the muzzle loading experience where fire took place at relatively close ranges. The lessons of the American Civil War were not learnt in this respect, and so, in 1879, the soldier still fired automatically whether a target presented itself or not, if it took cover the volley still went off.
17th October 2002	Bill Power Technology exploded within a 40yr span from 1848[the Minie,producing the P/58 muzzle-stuffer,the El Cheapo Deluxe conversion Snider-Enfields,M-H,Martini-Enfields( and its Cadet varient-ammo was undergoing a profound rethink) to the Lee-Metford issued in 1888! The "Brass" learned there trade in the Crimea,learned from the Napoleonic Wars! It is almost an axiom,that commanders fight the previous war! So,what was the PBI[Poor Bloody Infantry]to make of this @ RD?! No designated fields of fire,no Musketry instuctions on a target-a raw 2nd Battalion in it's 1st serious drama;the "Lads" done good!! Individual marrksmanship was only taught after the experience of the Boer War! The Boers were crack shots with a Gw 98 Mauser that could get your attention from 1000yds[Cf;-Kiplings "Ubique"]! Lessons were learned by the next generation of officers! The BEF @ Mons blew apart the German advance[they believed they faced machine-guns,not SMLE Mk1;s @ 30 rounds/min}! So,this leap in firepower was analogous to Stephen Jay Gould's{the celebrated Paleontologist]idea of "Punctuated Equilibrium" as applied to Darwinian evolution! Actually.Gould stole the thesis from an essay published in 1876 by Frederich Engels-The Role of Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man;a development of the dialectic of George Wilhelm Fredric Hegel!
3rd April 2005	Chris ...I wonder how many bullets were fired towards the Oskarberg?...