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Date	Original Topic
11th November 2002	If You were in Command at Isandwana By Dan Rudary I'm building off of a topic started by Glenn on November 10th about what you would do if you were Chard. Now I am asking what would you have done at Isandwana if you knew the Zulus were coming. I am going to ask that anyone who is answering this disregard thier knowledge of the battle, and put themselves in the shoes of Bvt. Col. Dunford on Jan. 22 1879. I am looking forward to your replies! Thanks, Dan Rudary
Date	Replies
12th November 2002	Miguel I have one simple answer for your question. In one word: 'form a square'. If my scouts tell me that the main Impi is heading my way, I would laager my wagons (regardless of standing orders from Lord Chelmford) and set a perimeter (a square) with three ranks of soldiers concentrating fire on every side. The field of fire would be splendid and the Zulus would have to cross a much larger stretch of fire-swept ground before actually engaging the British. Besides, the ammo would be readily available and the confidence of the soldiers much stronger. It worked in Ulundi after all, right? And in Waterloo against the French cavalry by that matter.
12th November 2002	Peter Ewart I've never been in the slightest doubt as to what Durnford intended to do but, as far as I know, my hypothesis has never been supported by anything which has been published. However, if we rely on primary (or reliable secondary) sources, it all seems crystal clear to me. When Durnford arrived at the nek & rode towards the centre of camp, he waslookingfor Coghill. It was Coghill, he was certain, who would know in which tent was stored the Centre Column's cricket gear. He was well aware that the 24th contained many keen cricketers among both officers & NCOs & that therefore there would be plenty of togs at hand - but in which tent? Durnford had not played the game since his youthful days in Kent, where he had, not surprisingly, picked up his love for it after leaving Ireland. His time in Natal had been barren - there was never any country house cricket at Bishopstowe & Colenso himself, coming from a minor county,was certainly no cricketer. Visits to the Bishop's family therefore brought him nothing but frustration, especially as he strongly believed that the whole "raison d'etre" of the imperial cause was to export and spread " the noble game" to the colonies. He had no quarrel with the Zulu - rather, he looked forward to showing Cetshwayo how to keep a straight bat on the plain at Mahlabatini, which, Durnford was convinced, would provide the perfect square. But Coghill - ah, Coghill! - would help him to get things organised. After all, he would get a game wherever he could, and had succeeded in doing so in South Africa (Diary, NJAC: 24 Jan 1877, see p59 Nevill P., "Whom the Gods Love", Aylburton, 1966). As we all know, Coghill had terrible news. His knee was crocked & he couldn't play - and worse, on the 20th when all the cricketing equipment had been stored away, he had been out of camp with the General & Glynn & so hadn't actually seen it packed away. It could be anywhere. Durnford looked along the lines of bell tents and cursed. It simply had to be somewhere - and he was right. We also know it was somewhere under canvas (Montague W.E., "Campaigning in S Africa - Reminiscences of an Officer in 1879", Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh, 1880) but we'll never know in which tent. "Where's Charlie Pope"? Fortunately, Coghill knew. "Out there to the east, towards the plain - company on piquet duty." Excellent. Pope would know which tent - enjoyed a game before coming out here. (Kentish Express & Ashford News, 26 Aug 1876). But time was pressing, with Zulus on the hills to the NE - only just time to persuade them to play instead of fight. Durnford rode east, followed by his loyal Horse (perhaps he had taught them too?) and as he approached Pope's company he anxiously surveyed the ground for what might provide a suitable wicket. We have no record of their conversation - that Pope did not insert a note in his diary that morning when less important matters were entered is incomprehensible. But Durnford's journey was wasted - if Pope knew where the stuff was, it was too late anyway. And worse was to come - when Durnford asked about Penn Symons, another keen player (ibid.) the news was bad. "Came right past here before dawn, Colonel - he'll never get back here in time to help us today." This was serious. It was bad enough Bromhead's company being stranded at Rorke's Drift, as he would have been a very useful opening bat (ibid.) but it couldn't be helped. But Coghill crocked, Pope can't help, Penn Symons miles away & Bromhead almost as far in the other direction - what a disastrous day this could turn out to be. The gear was there somewhere (Montague) and if it could be located and pads donned, Durnford could still persuade the Zulus to hold off, toss him up a few and all would be well. This was poor organisation on Glynn's or Pulleine's part - or perhaps even the General's. After all, who had stuck Pearson out on the coast - he loved the game and never missed Canterbury Cricket Week when stationed at the depot (Kentish Gazette, my notes illegible for date, but c1865). And now he was virtually at the seaside! And who on earth had appointed that chap Smith as acting chaplain to the column? He's certainly no cricketer - what was wrong with his colleague, Thurston Button, who had been a superb opener back in England and was now probably dying for a game but who's been wasting his time at High Flats and is now stuck out at Clydesdale - he won't get a game there. We knowthe rest - all because the kitbag couldn't be found, opened up in time & conveyed to the front line - had it been done, the Zulus would have been convinced. Worse - the Zulus found the stuff & didn't know what to do with it. Left the pads in the tent (Montague) & took the balls and bats. What a waste. And the bunch that came out for the 2nd invasion brought nothing but hunting & shooting gear (The Times, March 1879) so another chance was lost. Yes, I know that Durnford's ambition of cricket in Zululand wasachieved in his absence, but it wasn't the same - it didn't involve the 24th, who weren't there, it wasn't at oNdini and it wasn't against the Zulus. Still, at least it took place in front of some of them and the 58th Reg't did us proud by getting their priorities right at Fort Evelyn (Natal press, 23 Jly 1879 - acknowledgements to L&Q for Red Book)and providing a"very good"pitch to play on, so that good batting&bowling ensued, even though the wickets and balls had to be constructed anew & the bats made from tools. High scores, excellent catching - a brilliant one at long off - and plenty of sport for the NLH (ibid.) probably ensured that the game took off in Zululand once the missionaries returned.("Post for assistant curate exists in outlying rural parish - slow left armer would suit." Church Times, Jan 1880?) The 58th had grasped the nettle. Never mind about chasing the King, they got on with what the campaign was supposed to have been about in poor Durnford's opinion - it was weeks before the secondary aim had been accomplished. And even then the King's words were suppressed - surely what he had earlier said was "First comes the trader, then comes the missionary, then comes the MCC." Always go back to the original source ... Am I right or am I right? Peter
12th November 2002	Miguel No no no no. You got it all wrong, Peter, my dear, your in-deep investigation, impressive as it is, missed crutial evidence. It was not cricket they were after at Isandlwana, but soccer. All historians agree in that the Zulus disemboweling people was a clear evidence of early hooliganism, as this ancient practice is still honored in nowaday's Premier League. Some revisionists have recently formulated another theory basically saying that it was not soccer nor cricket but rugby, since the outcome of the battle pretty much resembled what happens when a British team faces a group of all blacks. Damn they have a point there, don't they? Of course, historians argue that lucky for the English that Jonah Lomu wasn't born at the time, otherwise not only Rorke's drift would have been overrun that day but Helpmekaar and Cape Town as well, until Jonah would have stopped his particular spree and head for the pub to get a beer and discuss the match with the lads.
12th November 2002	Alex Rossiter I think probably i would have just kept all the troops and the 24th back just infront of the first row ,and the artillery at either end of the the line . This then should effectively stop what probably caused the disaster when the 24th had to pull back when durnfords men ran out of ammo and left the right flank open! I not sure if it would have been possible to form a square in the time they were given because those wagons would have been very heavy and all the other equitment to sort out and leave outside etc.....
12th November 2002	Alan Critchley when I was at Isandhlwana (Isandlwana) a few weeks ago, Ian Knight gave his view on the position of the British line. It's a long way from the main camp. On every occasion I've been there, I cannot for the life of me understand why they were so far out. Logic says that if you extend your perimeter, the gap between each soldier increases. Couple with that the problem of ammunition supply, couple (or is that treble) with that having a commanding officer (Pulleine) who had had no previous battle experience, you have a catastrophy asking to happen. The wagons were on the nek between Isandhlwana and Black's koppie. Surely a formation could have been made here, assuming of course that the tents had been struck, as they should have been and therefore give a clear view of the approaching Zulus as well guarding their rear from the right horn of the Zulus I love hindsight Alan
12th November 2002	Bill Cainan I think it's important to try and put yourself in Pulleine's position. He and his staff were probably convinced for most of the battle that what they were facing was NOT the entire Zulu Army, probably a few Zulu Regiments at most. After all, was not Chelmsford off to the south-east dealing with the main Zulu army ? When the NNH reported that a large Zulu force eas coming across the plateau to attack the Camp, Pulleine deployed his companies to meet what he perceived to be the threat - a few Zulu Regiments. What he saw coming over the plateau lip was to his mind probably the whole of the Zulu force INCLUDING the horns ! He deployed according to Chelmsford's instructions with his artillery being flanked by his rifle companies, and with them in turn being flanked by cavalry/NNC. How far forward do you deploy ? Well the Martini Henry has quite a long range (1400 yards), with the companies liking to fire effectively at between 600 and 800 yards. Unfortunately within that range is dead ground, and I agree fully with Ian Knight, that it is likely that the Companies would, at least initially have been deployed further forward to cover that dead ground with their fire. Had the Zulu centre been in fact the whole of the Zulu force, then this deployment may well have done the trick. However, the fact that Pulleine was facing the full Zulu Army with 20,000 + warriors and whose horns were up to ten miles apart meant that his line had dangerously exposed flanks, which he was soon to realise. Reality probably sank in when he noticed Durnford's engagement with the Zulu left horn. It may be that he, at that time, pulled the line back to align it with the rocky knoll (and the artillery) and to start to incline the right end of the line into the "L" shape, with some of his troops facing East, and the rest North.. On seeing Durnford failing to hold up the left horn, he then probably gave the fatal order to fall back on the camp. And the rest is History ! Had he also failed to appreciate the Zulu right horn, where it was and what it was doing ? Probably ! He does not seem to have taken any further interest in it once Mostyn & Cavaye had disengaged. Perhapos he thought it was a raiding party heading for Rorke's Drift ? Of course, after Isandlwana, it is obvious that you need a formation that is compact and has no flanks - the square. But it took the disaster for commanders to appreciate that fact - the Zulus were something special and needed to be respected. Don't get bogged down with the need to entrench and/or laagering waggons - it's how you deploy your infantry that is crucial - as witnessed by Gingindhlovu and Ulundi. But as Alan says above, hindsight makes life so easy ! Bill
12th November 2002	steven id call reynbolds from rourkds drift down to isanalawana. im relates to reynolds
12th November 2002	Peter Ewart Many very good points, Bill. For some time Pulleine (or Melvill, or whoever else he spoke to) may well have thought that simply stringing a line of infantry out to the front would be quite sufficient - as per some of the skirmishes of 1877/78. A sudden rush would surely cause too many Zulu casualties and not be attempted - but it was the rush which was to prove so deadly. Add, too, Chelmsford's recent written instructions as to dispositions. It may well have been ages before Pulleine realised that this was something more than just a hiccup before moving the camp onwards & eastwards later that day or on Thursday. Anything which happened near the camp would surely be only temporary and peripheral to the main show 12 miles away. Something else which occurs to me. P's line of vision. Not the red herrings about smoke or the eclipse, but the lie of the land, quite apart from the dead ground far out to the NE. I've forgotten where Pulleine's tent was now but although reliable sitings of him during the engagement are few & far between, he presumaby wasn't in the same place all the time? If he wanted to see it all he would have had to move about and, to see it all at once, would have had to back off up against the hill to a reasonable height. What shook me rigid when I stood to the S, SSE or even SE of the hill, off the nek and among the southern part of the camp, was that the gradual eastern slope down from the hill and through the camp cuts off one's vision of almost ALL the ground to the NE. The gentle hump between me and, say, the direction of Mostyn/Cavaye etc AND the action to the far NE as well, made much of the battle invisible to many of those in the camp. But if Pulleine moved around a lot, how did runners find him? Obviously, the further east one travelled out of the camp, the less the slope would have interfered with the view to the NE. Of course it's all just fruitless (& probably ill- informed!) speculation, but the way in which that gentle slope cuts off the view in that direction (not counting the unstruck tents!) unless one backs away upwards, made quite an impression on me. Should've been obvious beforehand, of course! Anyone else? Or am I exaggerating? Or would Pulleine have stayed just under the hill, halfway along & reasonably elevated? Peter
13th November 2002	John Young Peter, Your cricket match analogy brought to mind the 1885 Sudan tour. Big Fred' Burnaby was the opening bat at Abu Klea, swotting them right and left - he was out of his crease, when he was caught at a very silly-point. All this because Charlie Beresford decided he could play the match outside of the square, only to discover he had some faulty equipment. The team captain at that game, Herbert Stewart, soon discovered the painful consequences of leaving his box in the pavillion. I am told the encouragement of 'the barmy army' that day apparently left alot to be desired. The constant yelling of "Play up, play up, and play the game!" rather dampened the occasion, until bad light - not caused by any eclipse - stopped play. John
14th November 2002	Peter Ewart John, Ah, Newbolt & his schoolboy! I understand his "jammed Gatling" was actually a "Gardner gun" although I'm no authority whatsoever on weapons. I doubt that even the Barmy Army would have made their voices heard above the row that day. And was not Burnaby's very presence an indictment on Wolseley's choice of 2IC - at least in the eyes of his enemies? (& I don't means the ones in the desert!) I understand that Newbolt based the opening verse of V.L. on Clifton College (where all pupils were forced to watch even house matches!) although I imagine any public school would have done. Kipling places the military prowess of the Dervish well above that of the Zulu in his lines on Abu Klea in which he makes an oblique reference to Isandlwana. He was smitten by the Fuzzy-Wuzzies, who "broke a British Square" and whom he toasted - on behalf of Tommy Atkins - offering them a fair fight again at any time in the future. A prescient view? One chap at Abu Klea, Lord Edward Somerset,was the brother of one of the witnesses in the baccarat case you alluded to in your recent trivia puzzle. Another brother, Lord Arthur ("Podge") was also on the Nile expedition but not at Abu Klea & had to leave the country in 1889 to avoid a court hearing in a notorious London "rent-boy" scandal. As boys, they all played cricket for my own village club, as did Methuen and, briefly, Luard, the chap who tried to restore the reputation of Durnford & the RE. You (or Miguel) must not consider my previous an account a mere analogy, but the real underlying story! If I get a moment I'll return to it sometime & support the argument further. Peter
14th November 2002	Alan Critchley Huh? Alan
15th November 2002	James Garland The roots of the disaster at Isandhlwana are to be found in the 1877/78 Kafir War. The British did not appreciate just how different the Zulu Army was from their previous antagonists. To put it simply the British treated the Zulus with contempt. There is a punch cartoon showing John Bull sitting at a desk whilst a Zulu warrior is writing " Despise not your enemy" on a blackboard. I honestly think that the British line was extended because they arrogantly expected that a black army would not stand up to Martini fire but would flee after a few volleys. How wrong they were.