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DateOriginal Topic
29th August 2001Lack of ammunition at Isandlwana?
By Jeff Lum
I went back to review a few accounts of Durnford�s movements during the Isandlwana battle and it appears that his position was secure up to the point were he started to run low of ammunition. The men he sent back to camp reportedly couldn�t find their ammunition wagons. Mr. John Young brought to light that Durnford�s Horse used arms of a different caliber than the Martini-Henrys used by virtually everyone else in the camp. This single striking detail leads me to pose the obvious question: What happened to Durnfords ammunition that no one else in the camp could have used?

There have been arguments over ammunition supply � whether or not there was enough to defend the camp. Could it have been just a tragic mistake that during the heat of furious attack, short of ammunition and time to think clearly, some other unit mistakenly took Durnfords supplies - which was useless at their end, thereby precipitating not just one, but two fronts to fall?

Could we ever know?
DateReplies
30th August 2001John Young
Jeff

As to what happened to Durnford's ammunition, I imagine the Zulu victors had a field day with it. For alot of it would have matched the weapons they had, even those with muzzle-loaders would have been able to take the powder from the cartridges.

As to confusion over supplies, the wagons were equipped with a system of identification flags. One of Chelmsford's good ideas thought up prior to the invasion.

An ammunition wagon had a red flag;

A supply wagon had a blue flag;

A staff wagon had a red & white flag;

Royal Artillery wagons had a red & blue flag;

The 24th's wagons had a red over green flag;

Local regiments had a red over yellow flag;

Ambulances had a flag showing the Red Cross.

In fact if you look at "Zulu Dawn" you'll see they went as far as to include these details in the production.

Now all these details were meant to have been 'cascaded' down from the officers who had their issued hand-books, to their n.c.o.'s and then down the line to other-ranks. So even the lowest of the low of the European troops there should have known the difference. As to whether anyone had bothered to tell the loyal African soldiers those facts is of course another matter, although I feel the N.N.H. troopers would have had some idea.

The confusion may have occurred within the local units, however, for the most part each of the local volunteer units had a Quartermaster or at least a Quartermaster-Sergeant present, the exception being the Natal Mounted Police.

Durnford's wagons were obviously at the rear of his part of No.2 Column, under the escort of Lt. R.W. Vause's No. 3 Troop, Sikali's (modern accepted spelling Zikhali's) Horse. Personally, I think the one who had an incline as to where in the mass of wagons that were already there was indeed Vause. I contend that Durnford, George Shepstone, Captain W. Barton, and least of all Lt. William Cochrane, the Transport Officer, did not have a clue as to where those wagons were, but that is my contention, I have no hard facts to support this assumption.

As to the ammunition supply this is where this battle I contend falls down, from a British point of view. The lines of communication between the companies on the firing line and the supply in the camp were too extended. With the best will in the world, runners, bandsmen etc could not keep up and adequate supply. There were both mule-drawn carts and ammunition mules in the camp, but even using them, I again contend, a supply to meet demand could not have been met. As to the companies themselves they were not all shoulder-to-shoulder either, some men were several yards apart from their neighbour adding to the problem.

So yes their was an ammunition problem as far as I'm concerned with its supply.

John
30th August 2001Ian Woodason
Interesting point about ammo. Certainly, ammo failure was a factor with
Durnford - although he told both Captains Essex and Gardner that he was withdrawing
because 'the position was too extended'. He was at that point being
outflanked on both sides. His main ammo problem was that his supply wagons,
escorted by Lt Vause, arrived in the camp after he left, and Lt Davies and other
runners couldn't find them. Later, Sgt Major Kambule was refused ammo by the 24th
drummer boy, but its an interesting point - could they have used it anyway?
But as to the 24th getting the wrong ammo, I don't think so - they would have
gone to their own camp, and we have all that Captain Essex stuff about loading up a
cart with the 2/24th's reserve supply, and sending it out. Plus, the age-old
killer in my view - the Zulus say over and over again that the 24th were
still firing long after the line collapsed.

Ian Woodason www.keynshamlighthorse.com
30th August 2001jeff lum

In addition to my proposed scenario, someone else had suggested some of the rifles were jamming at Isandlwana, but at Rorkes Drift the same Martini-Henrey's worked fine.
Would anyone know the source of those reports? I'd like to know how much they could be relied upon.

But honestly, I wouldn't know if the larger bullets used by Durnford's unit could even have gotten far enough down far enough into the chamber of a Martini-Henri to even cause a jam. But if it were possile ....