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Date	Original Topic
7th December 2001	Chelmsford after the War By Peter Critchley Stephen McDonald asked: "Clearly, Chelmsford was tainted by the Zulu War and by his command decisions prior to Isandlwana. Here's the question...did he ever make any comments or statements about the War? And specifically about his command of the Campaign?" To help with this, I have taken a passage from 'Soldiers of the Victorian Age' By Charles Rathbone Low 1880. "Though public opinion was divided in the press, in society and in the army, was much divided as to the generalship displayed by Lord Chelmsford, every one was agreed that he was actuated by a determination to do his best without regard to personal convienience, and that he never spared himself in the public service. The cardinal defects of his conduct of the campaign would appear to have been:- his share in the Isandlana (sic) disaster, already referred to ; a dilatoriness in the final advance after his preparations had been completed; his retreat after the battle of Ulundi, thus endangering the fruits of his victory; and his retirement from Etshowe (sic). Political, if not military considerations, apparently, demanded his retention of this post, as the situation bore a remarkable analogy to that after the relief of Lucknow, in November, 1857, when Sir James Outram held his ground at Alumbagh, after Sir Colin Campbell had withdrawn the garrison, with the sick and non-combatants, from the Residency. Equally with that memorable defence of an open position, a great moral effect would have accrued, had a garrison remained in the heart of Zululand, almost within striking distance of the capital, while the military advantage is apparent. But Lord Chelmsford was not an Outram. A strict disciplinarian and total abstainer, Lord Chelmsford has always been popular in the army, while his upright character and blameless life have acquired for him the respect and affection of his numerous friends." Hope that helps! (Thanks to Martin Everett for supplying the relevent sources) Peter
Date	Replies
11th December 2001	Fred I've not seen much mentioned on how hurried Chelmsfords preparations were. There would seem to be reasons why he would have wanted to wait a while (e.g. in order to be able to bring the NNC up to a reasonable state of combat efficiency. It does seem precipitate to raise a volunteer force of around 7,000 and then commit them to action two months later). It seems to me that it was Bartle Freres need to avoid being overruled in his decision to commence a war with the Zulus and to present London with a fait accompli which determined some of Chelmsfords actions, e.g. to commence the invasion in January, rather than later. Or is this a conjecture too far?
17th December 2001	Stephen McDonald First, thanks Peter (& Martin) for the research done on Chelmsford. If one reads between the lines, there are some major statements about Chelmsford's ability to command. Perhaps, someday someone will find writings that Chelmsford has done where he comments on the campaign. Second, in answer to Fred's comments. Refer to the book 'The Zulu War: A Pictorial History' by Michael Barthorp. Chelmsford was planning for the campaign since August & to his credit did a good job in preparing for the campaign. Even ammo was calculated to the man. Logistically, it was a tough War to fight & I think Chelmsford did a good job. Having said that, his decisions in the field were wrong & played a major role in the defeat at Isandlwana. In fact, if you look at the overall campaign, he assumed much and split his forces a number of times. Shades of Custer?