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DateOriginal Topic
6th November 2003timewatch programme
By Ron Lock

Julian
Copy of programme has arrived by kind favour of a friend. Well, I think you have already said it all, and said it well. Has your letter appeared in the press?

I think we will have to agree to differ as to whether or not Chelmsford’s column fell for a Zulu decoy, but as it makes interesting discussion no reason not to press on with support for our opinions.

Lt Milne RN perceived that the column had fallen for a ruse in his letters of the 23rd and 25th Jan which is hardly hindsight. The same goes for Lt Banister’s letter which was written from Rorke’s Drift on the 27th, and Lt Halam Parr wrote to Sir Bartle Frere shortly after his arrival there.

Two of these men were staff officers and I cannot see that they would have anything to gain by admitting that they and their general had fallen for one of the oldest tricks of warfare.

A hand written unsigned memorandum from the Intelligence Dept dated Feb 11/79 that found its way to Windsor, states “He” [Lord Chelmsford] “ was led away by the Zulus who decoyed him from the camp.”

As for the contemporary Zulu accounts, these were given by captives. It would not have been in the interest of Chelmsford’s army to admit that it had been duped by a native foe and apart from those perceptive or honest enough to admit that it had, the army would be at pains to conceal the fact. Thus, the interrogators and interpreters taking Zulu statements, either by coercion or intimidation, would have their prisoners say what they, the interrogators, wished to hear. I think it is pertinent that although Ntshingwayo kaMahole, the Zulu commander, was given one of the thirteen chiefdoms after the war, no one it seems took the trouble to record his account of the battle.

The gaffe of two British soldiers discovering the Zulu army is inexcusable. It was Lt Raw and his troop of the Natal Native Horse that first encountered the enemy – that is if one discounts the earlier skirmishes of the day. The Zulu army was not hiding in the Ngwebini Valley but was already deploying. Raw reported, “We left the camp proceeding over the hills. The enemy in small groups retiring before us for some time, drawing us on for four or five miles from the camp where they turned and fell upon us, the whole army showing itself from behind a hill in front where they had evidently been waiting.
DateReplies
6th November 2003Andy Lee
Ron

What really shocked me about the timewatch programme was when it claimed Robert Jones met his end whilst chasing imaginery Zulu's in his garden and questioning his state of mind. In my opinion his death was a sad accident whilst on a crow shoot.

Regards

Andy
6th November 2003John Young
Andy,

I made the same point about the confusion of the two stories of Robert & William Jones. Only to be called 'an anorak' & 'grumpy' for daring to challenge the Anglo-Zulu War according to Dr. Saul David

John Y.
6th November 2003Melvin Hunt
Ron
Could I refer you to a thread I started on 4th Oct re the discovery of the Impi? All of the sources quoted describe a scene where the impi is seated and hiding. Could you throw any more light on why phrases like " the impi sprung up" would be used.
Can I say that I think "Zulu Victory" is an immensly readable, well written book and a welcome addition. (Full marks for the video too) However, I have a problem with this "game of chess" theory. Are these the same Zulus who, in future battles, knew no other tactics but to hurl themselves on the Martini rifles regardless?
Thanks for continuing the discussion.
John,
I personally know you and I can't see why you should be called "grumpy".
As for anorak?.........-"post 1881 frock coat"?
Cheers
Mel (slightly tongue in cheek)
7th November 2003Julian whybra
Ron, the point I wanted to make re the 'lure' was that subsequent British officers' opinions are largely irrelevant. A historian can only present an analysis on the evidence provided by the Zulus themselves. I will find time to look through my collection of Zulu accounts pertaining to this before I write more and get back to you via the website.
7th November 2003ed.coan
Ron - just taking up Melvin's point in the spirit of friendly discussion, you don't really answer why you feel the Zulu's never tried to split a British force again during the war, given if it was deliberate, it worked so successfully at Isandlwana.
Ed
PS: Sorry if someone's already said this, but in the Timewatch programme Dr.David in effect said that Coghill and Melvill left the battlefield together, which we now know is simply not true.
8th November 2003Ron Lock
Melvin, and a belated comment to Bill Cainan’s letter of a month ago. You mention all the sources stating that the Zulu Army sprung up from where it had been hidden in a valley. I don’t know who first stated this as a fact, but Donald Morris certainly did: “There was a long moment of electric tension as Raw’s trooper peered over the lip of the ravine, and the effect on the thousands of Zulus was as profound as it was on the solitary horseman. The impi had been discovered …” There is no reference or source given to support this statement, but I think it has been taken as fact ever since Donald wrote “The Washing of the Spears” almost forty years ago. The scene was perpetuated by the film “Zulu Dawn” and I think it has been a case of “History repeats itself and historians repeat each other.”

Just to repeat what Raw actually said in his report, “…drawing us on for four or five miles from the camp where they turned and fell upon us, the whole army showing itself from behind a hill in front where they had evidently been waiting.” Sgt-Major Nyanda of the NNH, who was also present, reported, “We saw a handful of Zulus who kept running from us, all of a sudden, just as Mr Shepstone joined me on the crest of a ridge, the army of Zulus sprung up, 15,000 men.” Not in a ravine but behind a hill. Bearing in mind that both troops of the NNH had travelled 4/5 miles along the top of the Nqutu plateau, the only hill that fits is the crest of iThusi, at the eastern end of the plateau just before it slopes down into the Ngwebini Valley, or ravine, where part of the Zulu army had spent the night. To give added credence that iThusi is the hill in question, Henry Francis Fynn (Junior) who was an intelligence officer and interpreter with Chelmsford’s column, later wrote, “They [the NNH] observed the Zulus showing over a cock’s comb rocky side of a ravine …" The crest of iThusi is just that, ragged and shaped like a cock’s comb as can be seen from the picture of iThusi on page 99 of ‘Zulu Victory.’

Furthermore, the approach to iThusi, along the plateau, is up a gently rising slope, the ridge or crest of which is more or less in line with the foot of iThusi. The reverse side of the ridge, gently sloping at first, would indeed conceal an army up until about 200 yards of any enemy’s approach. Hence Nyanda’s remark, “… of a sudden … on the crest of a ridge, the army of Zulus sprung up …”

As for Melvin’s question that queried the generalship of the Zulu army, which in later battles did little more than throw itself on the rifles and bayonets of the British infantry, this was not so. At Hlobane, the whole of Buller’s column was lured up onto the heights, where again the Zulus disappeared, only to fall upon the column when it had reached the dead end of Devil’s Pass. The result was the second worse defeat of the war.

There was also the surprise dawn attack on the laagered camp of the 80th at iTombi Drift, where two thirds of the convoy, about 100 men, were killed and 90,000 rounds of ammunition captured. At Kambula, had not Buller and the cavalry sallied out and provoked the young warriors of the Zulu right horn into a premature attack, the result of the battle may well have been very different.
Ron.
10th November 2003ed.coan
Ron - personally, I'd never considered Buller to have been lured up to Hlobane. Always thought it was a tactical move by Wood to take the mouintain to try and neutralise the threat of the abaQulusi. Would be interested in your further views.

Don't also think you can consider the ambush at iTombi, or the movements at Ulundi to reflect on Zulu 'lure' tactics.

It's all opinions (which is what makes it interesting!), but I can't see how the notion that the Zulus consciously lured Chelmsford out of camp prior to Isandlwana is sustainable.

Ed
12th November 2003Ron Lock
Ed, Yes, you are quite right, Wood did initiate the attack on Hlobane led by Redvers Buller, in the same way it could be said that Lord Chelmsford inadvertently initiated the Zulu deception at Mangeni by ordering Dartnell's reconnaisance.

There were an estimated 2000 abaQulusi warriors already on Hlobane at the time of Buller's ascent, but apart from some firing from concealed marksmen, Buller was allowed to take the mountain unopposed, the abaQulusi melting away as he advanced. Then, believing there was to be no opposition, his column leisurely set about rounding up cattle, whilst the enemy cut off its line of retreat and manoevered them towards Devil's Pass and the disaster that followed. Buller came close to being duped once again on the day prior to Ulundi: his reconnaisance almost rode into a waiting trap composed of a 300 strong impu hidden in the long grass. As it was he lost several men in the encounter.

Zulu warfare was much based on deception and stealth. Even the Boer Trekkers fell victim to Zulu decoys, their defeat at Italeni in April 1838 - resulting in the death of Piet Uys, his son Dirkie and others - being an example.

Perhaps the success of the Zulu decoy on the 22 January, 1879, is difficult to accept due to the enormity of the subsequent British defeat. Be that as it may, it would seem Horse Guards and the Commander in Chief were under no delusion. Sir Charles Ellice, Quartermaster-General wrote to Lord Chelmsford on behalf of the Duke of Cambridge: "His Royal Highness has come to the conclusion that the primary cause of the misfortune, and that which led to all the others, was the under estimate formed of the offensive fighting power of the Zulu army"
12th November 2003Ron Lock
Ed, Yes, you are quite right, Wood did initiate the attack on Hlobane led by Redvers Buller, in the same way it could be said that Lord Chelmsford inadvertently initiated the Zulu deception at Mangeni by ordering Dartnell's reconnaisance.

There were an estimated 2000 abaQulusi warriors already on Hlobane at the time of Buller's ascent, but apart from some firing from concealed marksmen, Buller was allowed to take the mountain unopposed, the abaQulusi melting away as he advanced. Then, believing there was to be no opposition, his column leisurely set about rounding up cattle, whilst the enemy cut off its line of retreat and manoevered them towards Devil's Pass and the disaster that followed. Buller came close to being duped once again on the day prior to Ulundi: his reconnaisance almost rode into a waiting trap composed of a 300 strong impu hidden in the long grass. As it was he lost several men in the encounter.

Zulu warfare was much based on deception and stealth. Even the Boer Trekkers fell victim to Zulu decoys, their defeat at Italeni in April 1838 - resulting in the death of Piet Uys, his son Dirkie and others - being an example.

Perhaps the success of the Zulu decoy on the 22 January, 1879, is difficult to accept due to the enormity of the subsequent British defeat. Be that as it may, it would seem Horse Guards and the Commander in Chief were under no delusion. Sir Charles Ellice, Quartermaster-General wrote to Lord Chelmsford on behalf of the Duke of Cambridge: "His Royal Highness has come to the conclusion that the primary cause of the misfortune, and that which led to all the others, was the under estimate formed of the offensive fighting power of the Zulu army"
12th November 2003ed.coan
Thanks Ron. So I presume therefore, that it follows that your standpoint on 'the day of the dead moon' argument is that this is a red herring and that the Zulus were going to attack the relatively unprotected camp on 22nd Jan anyway, but the attack was enforced because the Zulu impi was untimely discovered?

Ed
12th November 2003Ron Lock
1. Read "impi of 3000 strong," not 300. Sorry my typo, Brenda.

2. Yes Ed, the Zulu impi was deploying to attack the camp as early as 0730 hours on the morning of the 22nd January. You are correct, that is my standpoint, and reading primary source evidence, a fact.
13th November 2003Adrian wright
Ron, this may be something of a crazy question, but why were Zulus herding cattle back in the direction of the Impi in the Ngwebini
valley if it was about to attack the camp ? In my opinion there would be no real need for them to do so as there was an abundance of livestock in the camp along with tons of supplies for the taking. Am I talking nonsense ? Herding cattle seems a complete waste of time to me - unless of course the Zulus wanted to be seen and pursued ?
Adrian
13th November 2003Melvin Hunt
Ron
Thanks for the further input.
Could I ask if the initial deployment began at 0730, why was the main part of the impi still not deployed over 4 hours later when spotted by Raw?
Where did the initial 0730 deployment go to for over 4 hours upto the time of Raw's encounter?
Cheers
Mel
14th November 2003Julian Whybra
Ron, re your 12th Nov comment (2) - what primary source evidence?
16th November 2003Ron Lock
Sorry for the delay, Ed, Melvin and Julian. When Ntshingwayo kaMahole, the Zulu commander was appraised of Chelmsford's departure from the camp soon after sunrise on the 22nd, and then decided to attack that day, he was about to orchestrate a battle over vast distances. His only means of communication were runners. Between say 0700 hours and 1030 he not only had thousands of troops to deploy in their various regiments, ready for the main thrust at the camp, he also needed to wait for assurance that Chelmsford's column had indeed fallen for his ruse and were not prematurely returning to camp. It would seem that he even took precautions against such a move on Chelmsford's part by stationing a reserve of 3000 warriors between him and Isandlwana. The execution of these orders and manoevres over many miles, initiated by runners, would explain the apparent delay in launching the main Zulu attack. For instance, a Zuly runner, or a series of runners, travelling from Ntshingwayo's command position at the head of the Ngwabeni valley to Chelmsford's breakfast spot, would have to cover 26 miles, there and back!


Julian, I assume you want primary source for my contention regarding Hlobane:

Diary of Sgt. Major F. W. Cheffins, Raaffs Rangers, held in private collection.
Letter dated 3 April, 1879, written by Lt. W. Pickering, Bakers Horse.
Lt. Col. Redvers Buller's report dated 29 March, 1879, London Gazette.
"Running the Gauntlet" by G. Mossop, F.L.H.
Unpublished manuscript written by Capt. Dennison, Weatherleys Border Horse.
Report dated 29 March, 1879 written by Major W. Knox Leet who commanded Woods Irregulars.

All the above were in Buller's column during the attack on Hlobane.
17th November 2003Keith Smith
Gentlemen

Sorry to be so late coming into this most interesting discussion but I am presently in KZN and have infrequent access.

May I come to Ron Lock's defence to argue, with him, that the Zulu army was already deploying on the morning of the 22nd and that preparations for the attack were made by Ntshingwayo in the early morning by eliminating the vedettes on Qwabe and Itusi hills. The reason for the delay between these events and the actual dicovery was due to the Zulu wish to approach the camp more closely by leaving the ravine and moving (a) up to the plateau and (b) down on to the plain behind Nyezi hill. These deployments, together with that of the right horn, were almost complete at the time of the discovery, about 11.45am. The problem most writers seem to have is that they want to place the discovery of the impi at the same location as their bivouac and this simply does not hold water. Not one of the witnesses : Raw, Nyanda, Hamer, describe a ravine but either a hill or a ridge behind which the army was waiting. This, I repeat, was not Mabaso Hill, but Itusi, as Ron says.

Sorry Julian, but I can't give any further evidence because I am far from home, but I have developed a discussion paper on this subject which I think amply demonstrates my points.