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rich


Joined: 01 May 2008
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And re: Maiwand, I read that Burrows' men fired about 383,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, about 2000 rounds a minute in 3 hours of combat..... and still couldn't win.

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Rich

That's a lot of ammo !

However, in saying that, firing vast quantities of ammunition, doesn't guarantee a win, especially if the enemy aren't being hit with much of it.

Maiwand is an engagement, which, as said previously, I wish had been covered more in publications. Maybe with the recent book's release, interest will amass, getting, perhaps, a title in, say, the Osprey Campaign Series.

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rich


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And I second your interest in Maiwand as well. Fascinating tactical battle.
I enjoyed going over Mike's analysis and seeing how the battle unfolded. One thing you have to say about open flanks. They're bad, very bad.

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Smith-Dorrien
Chris


Joined: 01 Feb 2007
Posts: 180
Location: S.A.
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rich wrote:

And re: Maiwand, I read that Burrows' men fired about 383,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, about 2000 rounds a minute in 3 hours of combat..... and still couldn't win.

Horace Smith-Dorrien mentions the expenditure of 50,000 rounds during a night scare.

Four OWN casualties

Fort FUNK



Chris
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Peter Ewart


Joined: 31 Aug 2005
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Chris

50,000 rounds in what was a comparatively brief episode seems an awful lot of rounds, even though there were plenty of soldiers in the fort and the firing may eventually have spread to all sides. A little investigation tends to confirm this.

Smith-Dorrien did, indeed, mention the expenditure of 50,000 rounds - but "50,000 rounds it was said at the time" is rather a long way from being an unimpeachable calculation, I'd suggest. S-D was on the spot that night, of course, but he doesn't say who had come up with this huge figure. More pertinently, he was writing more than 40 years after the event, and as the rest of his memoirs reveal quite a few inaccuracies and vague stories which were the result, quite clearly, of understandable mistakes due to the passage of time (or his limited knowledge at the time, or both) I'm fairly sure this figure of 50,000 (even if recalled accurately) can be put into that category.

Commeline, like Chard, was fired upon by these volleys and put pen to paper within three days. He stated that "some 2,000 or 3,000 rounds had been fired at us" which could just, of course, refer to only one side of the fort, although I doubt it. However, even multiplied by, say, four, we still wouldn't get more than 12,000 rounds. Commeline wrote in great detail at the time (see Keith Smith: Select Documents - A Zulu War Sourcebook (2006) and also his Studies in the Anglo-Zulu War (2007)) and these more contemporary calculations suggest greater accuracy.

Dawnay's private journal (published 1989) also contains the phrase "One regiment alone fired 1,200 rounds." Given that he was also present and narrowly escaped injury, was as disgusted as Commeline at the troops' behaviour and considered the expenditure very serious but quoted only 1,200 for what he may have thought the most serious figure for one of the regiments involved, it would seem that a maximum of around 3,000 rounds appears very feasible - certainly nowhere near the figure which S-D came up with nearly half a century later.

Of course, the huge embarrassment over this incident, for which officers were blamed, would have been as nothing compared to the red faces we'd have seen if Chard, the Empire's recent and celebrated VC, had been drilled with holes - as he very nearly was - by Tommy Atkins fresh out from England, even before he'd had it pinned on!

Peter
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Johnny Hamman


Joined: 11 Feb 2006
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I unearthed an article on Little Big Horn, and let me hasten to say that I cannot vouch for the veracity of some of the deductions in it, but most of it was based on a report from Dr. Richard Fox and his team from the University of South Dakota. The site was protected for a long time, a no-go area for archeologists, bur after the fire entry was granted. Apparently the site was rich in relics and physical evidence. and this prairie fire seemongly unearthed some uncomfortable truths in 1983. I quote:
"Fox's team spent several years unearthing human remains, artefacts, and most importantly, cartridges, cartridge cases and firearm parts. These were used to determine the positions of combatants and the role of individual weapons in the battle. They have decsribed what they have found as 'chaos in a desperate situation'. The locations of fired bullets and the cartridges that discharged them show that many soldiers were running and shooting over their shoulders [vectoring] rather than standing still to shoot.

...perhaps most telling, Fox's team never found a single bullet or case from a Colt revolver that had been fired from the last stand position..."
There's more, but I will keep with that for the time being. There are also some stuff about Major Marcus Reno., and a report by a Sergeant Kanipe that stated that there were never any horses around, dead or otherwise, so the enduring tale about the men forming ramparts from dead horses appear to be false...??

Any comments?

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Sawubona


Joined: 09 Nov 2005
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Although there are a notable number of similarities between the battles of Isandlwana and the LBH, terrain isn't one of them. The "Greasy Grass" (LBH) and its battlefield cover a huge amount of real estate and many areas simply aren't within sight of others. Sure Isandlwana has a few bits of "dead ground" that can be exploited by an attacker (or defender), but only as long as they hold a fairly static position. When two modern battleground hikers separate at the LBH, the quickly lose sight of one another, never to seen again. My point is that it's understandable if there seem to be as many versions of what happened at LBH as there were witnesses. Some are so dissimilar as to suggest that the narrators weren't even involved in the same battle. Whew! With that verbose caveat in mind...

The cavalry horses were apparently exhausted at the very start of the LBH-- they had already been driven hard for four days. Several of Reno's men fell behind because their mounts were completely played out and one Sioux stated with surprise that the troopers mounts were actually eating grass amid the flying bullets. All throughout the fluid battle, the NA's ("Native Americans") were seemingly collecting abandoned cavalry mounts-- it was easy they said, since the horses were too tired and hungry to do much more than just stand there. It wouldn't be a complete surprise to discover that few or no horses ever made it to Last Stand Hill.

Perhaps I'm not being fair, but my estimation of the competency of the "average" trooper in Custer's command is that he was an inept horseman and an abysmally poor marksman-- just the sort who, having no concept of "fire discipline" and unable to handle a single shot Springfield Trapdoor carbine at a gallop, would blaze through his pistol ammo before trying to juggle reins, cartridges, and a long gun on horseback. Reno himself expressed concern that he would be unable to handle a carbine while charging at the river, but then by several accounts he had the added impediment of a whiskey bottle as well. On foot and out of pistol ammunition at the end... It wouldn't surprise me.

Did the author give any hint that Custer's headshot might have been administered by his own brother Tom after GAC had been mortally wounded by a bullet above the heart? TC's body was later found nearby and GAC's pistol inflicted headwound suggested an execution as much as it did a random hit. By all accounts, it wouldn't be pleasant to be taken alive by the NA camp followers.
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rich


Joined: 01 May 2008
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Fascinaing stuff there in your last para Saw..

At Isandhlwana, the Zulu slit open the stomachs of the red soldiers but it had nothing to do with execution. At the LBH though I could see why the natives arguably would"execute" captured soldiers after Custer and his brothers, Lt Cooke and McIntosh's G company took "a leading role" in desecrating Lakota graves on their march to destiny. A pity for those guys. A little empathy perhaps could've at least saved them mutilation.

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Sawubona


Joined: 09 Nov 2005
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In retrospect, I should have written "execution/mercy killing". The aftermath of the earlier Sand Creek Massacre brought new dimension to the depths of depravity to which the American military could fall (scalps were the least of the body parts they harvested). The NA already had a long tradition of mutilation/torture of captives and now, after the dust had settled on the Greasy Grass, revenge for Sand Creek and the recent loss of "loved ones" at the LBH battle, the newer, higher bar for revenge would make a bullet through the brain a blessing for a cavalrymen in extremisl! Frankly, the collection of random body parts from the dead after a Zulu victory doesn't seem to me to hold a candle to the level of sophistication of torture of the living that was achieved by the NA of the Plains.

And yes, I'm convinced that Reno was "three quarters in the bag" for most of that day! Benteen, the only officer present worth a damn , said as much at the inquiry. And enough witnesses confirmed his statement to make me want to have been there to have given Reno a "field sobriety" test just to see if he was sober enough to drive a horse much less command men in battle against the likes of the Sioux and Cheyenne.
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Bill Berndt


Joined: 29 Apr 2007
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Saw:

Not totally sure Reno was "in the bag", but, as you say, there was some credible testimony. Too bad, he apparently had a good Civil War record, but, especially after LBH, went downhill incredibly fast, which, I can well understand, now that I think about it.

I am not sure I see any evidence of impairment between the first crossing of the creek, through the inital charge, and the gathering in the woods by the river. Could well have something to do with the brains that were splattered all over him when an indian ally (can't remember who and am writing this at lunch at work) was hit in the head next to him. He could have just lost it and resorted to alcohol when he topped the bluffs across the river, which is something I can't understand. If you are being continually attacked, one would think you want to keep your wits about you, not dull them.

Bill
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Sawubona


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Admittedly, Benteen was no fan of Reno , nor of Custer himself, which only added to the confusion that day. Benteen and a sizable portion of the Seventh were sent off on a "snipe hunt" to the West-- probably in revenge for his prior insubordination and physical threats against Custer. Still, there were several others present who later claimed they saw evidence of Reno's intemperance. Pvt. William Taylor stated that when Reno gave the order to "Charge" at the river, his words were slurred enough to cause him (Taylor) to turn around in time to see Reno drink from a bottle of "amber colored liquid" and then hand the same to his adjutant, Lt. Benny Hodgson.

The pivotal point of the battle, in my opinion anyway, occurred at the very beginning-- Reno's failed charge at the river! Any contribution Custer made that day was merely a sideshow. If Reno hadn't lost his nerve and fallen back, the outcome might have been completely different. Sitting Bull himself said that Reno's hesitation caused him to think that the Seventh was "coming to make peace or ...(was) bringing rations to us". Reno's command then fell back in disarray and from that point on, the course of the battle was determined by Luck and the NA. With Reno's loss of confidence, Custer and his widely separated command became the defenders rather than the attackers and they were obviously too out-manned, too out maneuvered and too out-gunned to play this role. Drunk, a coward, or simply incompetent? All of the above?

Bloody Knife, by the way. I had the luxury to be at home to write this Wink
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rich


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You know when I read of Reno's conduct as commander after his charge failed I immediately tried to place him in context at Rorke's' Drift or Isandhlwana. Liability or asset??? And I'd think Benteen would have comported himself well.

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Little Bighorn & Isandlwana. By Paul Williams
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