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Posted: Sun Jul 30, 2006 12:59 am

I reproduce below a quite astonishing statistic from a book of the battle of the Little Big Horn, R.A. Fox, Archaeology, History and Custer's Last Battle, pp. 46f.:

"Battles are extremely confusing experiences. Order is paramount but difficult to maintain. Events are often shaped by accident. G. Dyer argues that tactics, drill, and responses usually reduce the uncertainties of battle but are never an absolute guide to success. Tactics are prescriptions against confusion and disorder. Nevertheless, some disorganization attends every stage of an advance. Despite tactical prescription, intervals cannot be precisely maintained. Some lines advance slower or faster than others. Terrain may influence movements of the skirmish line. Enemy fire affects order. Some soldiers may malinger to avoid the impending clash.

Further, many soldiers in modern battle simply refuse to fire, although recognition of this phenomenon has come about slowly. As early as 1870, du Picq observed that firepower on the battle lines does not equate with manpower; not every soldier will fight. S. L. A. Marshall's World War II battle studies concluded that up to 85 percent, but more commonly 70 percent, of men in a company dispersed along a battle line will not fire. The root of this problem lies in the dispersal of troops on the line. Supervision among dispersed troops is more difficult than among massed troops. During the Korean War, the percentage of soldiers who used their weapons increased to 55 percent, primarily as a result of improved training. Though the Korean experience suggests that fire efficiency is variable, it remains clear that firepower on the line will not equal manpower."

I have omitted a number of footnote references. Does anyone have a comment as to the relevance of this matter to Isandlwana?

KIS

Posted: Sun Jul 30, 2006 1:26 am

Keith

Yes. It is irrelevant. This is a well known phenomenon of modern warfare and is entirely consequent upon 'modern' dispersed tactics - it refers to the age of automatic fire (though rapid bolt-action fire can achieve the same effect), and perhaps rather more specifically to the paralysing fear inculcated by the machine gun. It is about the number of people who are prepared to risk their own lives by popping their heads up in a firefight to use their weapons, compared to those who will take the easy option and elect to remain doggoe. The effect is mitigated by discipline, training and the quality of junior commanders. It occurs where people have the opportunity to sit out the firefight through dispersal, cover and confusion. At Isandlwana these factors did not apply. Red herring.

I should say the very earliest one might encounter this effect in the British experience of warfare (it would have come earlier to the French and the Prussians - in the war of 1870) is during the Boer War - Colenso and Modder River would be good examples, where the troops were caught flat-footed inside enemy fields of fire and just had to keep their heads down - and I suspect a few of the boys in that horribly exposed forward trench at Spion Kop would have thought twice about using their weapons - God help them.

Regards

Mike

Posted: Sun Jul 30, 2006 11:10 pm

Thanks Mike

I asked the question because the British skirmish line at Isandlwana was widely dispersed, with perhaps substantial gaps between companies. This might also be a reason why the ammunition issue was not such a serious problem as some believe it was.

KIS

Posted: Mon Jul 31, 2006 6:07 am

Keith

One could argue that the premise was entirely relevant, albeit for the Zulu impi, the first paragraph of your cite anyway. As Mike points out the second paragraph deals with being fired upon, which the Imperials at Isandlwana didn't seem to worry too much about and in general seemed to find rather amusing at first.

I find a quote from one of Private Ashley Goatham's (1/24th) letters to be rather revealing and support the combat readiness of the 24th -

"The 88th are a raw lot of Irish young fellows and don�t care what their officers say to them and their Colonel is like an old woman. Colonel Glyn is the man he knows how to handle a Battalion. When we are firing we lie down and when the 88th fire they kneel that is how they have lost them 3 men [at Draiborch in the last CFW]�"

From this it would seem that Col. Glyn drilled the 1/24th in firing from the prone position and would support the contention that few casualties were suffered prior to Zulu closing. I'm not sure how much of the early battle was fought prone though or if all the Coys. would have adopted this given the fluid nature of the battle. It would seem that open (skirmishing) order was drilled as well so one could think that the gaps between Coys. would be accounted for and not present a concern. No section leader let alone a Coy. Commander would leave an unsecured flank if he could help it.

The fact that they were drilled in firing from prone postition would also seem to indicate that the 'loose ball bag spewing cartridges' problem would already have been addressed. (I know they didn't have duct tape then but I feel confident that they came up with something to prevent them planting ammunition trees!)

[Given the topic title we could flesh this out and run with it for a bit if anyone else is interested, the Isandlwana firing line being a historically hot topic.]

Best

Michael

Posted: Mon Jul 31, 2006 2:29 pm

Michael

Great quote. It gives a real insight into the nature of the 9th C F War and how much that sort of skirmish line thinking predominated amongst the old African hands prior to 22 Jan.

The practical problem at Isandlwana in terms of the prone position however would be the long grass. Summer months, heavy rain etc. As you know the prone position is ruled out by any ground cover over shin high. Isandlwana had a blanket of luxuriant long grass on 22 Jan 79.

Keith

I think the key issue in terms of ammo expenditure, and I think quite a lot of people still haven't got this clear in their mind's eye, is just how invisible the Zulus were once they were driven to ground (at ranges from the firing line varying between say 250-400 yards). The combination of the Nyogane donga, lie of the land, boulders and grass would have enabled most of the Zs in the forward areas to disappear from view - and if they've disappeared from view no 'steady old shot' is going to waste ammuntion on them.

This is why Maori Browne can see large numbers of Zs on the plain - he is looking at the considerable bodies of warriors who are sheltering on the reverse slope of what I call the Nkengeni Ridge. These are the men who can see the rough time the vanguard elements are having and elect not to cross the ridge until something on the British side gives.

As collateral to the invisibility of the Zs in the donga - we have Degacher's company advancing 30 yards towards the enemy. He would only do that if the enemy was pinned down and he had nothing to shoot at - to improve his field of fire in other words.

I have read the Custer archaeology book and think highly of it, and as Michael points out, it makes all the right points about tactical cohesion - but in my view it comes down a bit too hard on the men of the 7th US. Cartridge case trails are all well and good but who can say what proportion of the evidence (those cases that have been picked up) is missing, and what completely contradictory inferences might follow if it was all still in situ.

What I find slightly bizarre in the Custer case, but you know my views on revisionist interpretation for its own sake, is how people like to say there was no last stand and it's all a myth - yet if you go to the battlefield - there is a cluster of graves all together on Custer Hill - if that's not a last stand it does a passing good impression of one!

As ever

Mike

PS. I agree with Michael - no gaps between companies in my view - that's just not what infantry men do. Are we repeating a bit of D R Morris here - or is there any source evidence to support Morris's remarks. I can't think of any. (Ordered both your books by the way!)

Posted: Mon Jul 31, 2006 8:52 pm

There can be no doubt that a stand was made on "Last stand hill". Custer was found there, together with his brother, and it has been long assumed that this must have marked the site of the last resistance. Folklore and Hollywood have continued with this for years and everyone hopes that this was the case.
Modern interpretation has found that the last resistance was made down by deep ravine, by troopers running away from Custers last defensive position. How many other mini last stands were also taking place at this time can only be guessed at.
Custer hill has the highest number of grouped gravestones but was not the fabled "Last stand" of the battle.

Regards Graham

Posted: Mon Jul 31, 2006 11:09 pm

M & M

I quite agree that the confidence of the men of the 24th was very high in the early stages of the conflict but as the Zulu drew nearer things must have become very serious for them. It seems to me, therefore, that a number of the men may have chosen not to fire in the later stages, for the reasons set out by Fox. The transition from stability to disintegration must have happened at some time, to at least some of the units.

Graham

I don't really want to get into a discussion of Custer at Little Big Horn because I know so little about it. It is the parallel of there being no survivors at both engagements that makes them so interesting and so difficult to construct.

KIS

Posted: Tue Aug 01, 2006 8:41 am

Keith

Forgive me but there is a grave danger here of starting another spurious Isandlwana hare running by mixing up a battlefield phenomenon identified of WWII and Korean battlefields, with an event from an entirely separate era of military history. The comparison does not apply. The passage you cite and the phenomenon in question can only occur when, by a combination of specific circumstances, a soldier can elect to keep his head down and in effect 'opt out' of a firefight. There was no option to opt out of the Battle of Isandlwana, (except in the fashion exercised by Lt Adendorff and others), nor for the regulars (who were committed so far forward as to be largely oblivious to imminent double envelopment) was there an incentive to do so, as the fight on the firing line was going well - it was the opposition who were on the receiving end, (although as I have indicated in HCMDB there would have been a lot of unaimed Zulu lead in the air - but nothing like enough to acheive the effect described here). Don't forget that we are not talking conscripts here, but the best and most campaign-hardened battalion in the colony who did not doubt for a single moment that the foolish 'natives' running into their frontal arcs were going to get a dreadful pasting. They were bursting to fire their weapons and once the Zulus were pinned in the Nyogane, there would have been something of a range day atmosphere about the scenario - that is why you get Smith-Dorrien's remark about people laughing and joking in the ranks. It is probable they were competing with each other to score hits. In addition, whether the men were down or not, the officers and sergeants would have been ranging up and down the fighting line, in a way that is not really very often possible in the WWII/Korea/Vietnam/subsequent military era. It is precisely because of the advent of much heavier rates of fire in the age of the machine gun, that officers and sergeants have to stop doing this - they are themselves forced (as a matter of doctrine) to take cover. Only then do we get into a military era where it is possible for individual riflemen to keep down in cover and sit out the fight. Trust an old soldier on this one!! It doesn't apply until the 20th Century.

Graham

Isn't the point that the handful of troopers who ran down the ravine (the 1876 precursor of the Fugitives' Trail?!) were doing exactly that - running not standing - and that the men who stood firm around the Custer may therefore safely be regarded as the 7th US's 'last stand'. I fear that with Custer, just as we have seen with the AZW, there is some use of cheap semantics in play by those who cast themsleves in the role of iconoclasts. Just because a handful of fugitives are bumped off at the end, doesn't mean a last stand hasn't occurred. I would have every sympathy with the men who fell on Custer Hill if they were shaking with anger on their fluffy white clouds at the dismissive way some writers and historians treat them these days. I have no doubt that that they could see just how how much trouble they were in, made a conscious decision not to panic or run, but to sell their lives as dearly as they could, and that they sat themselves down inside that ring of dead horses and did their damnedest to keep their Springfields in action, to shoot straight and to hope for a miracle. In other words that they died like soldiers. The injection of reality over romance of course is that not everybody did so, as the bodies in the ravine show. But that is no reason to deny the existence of a last stand by the brave men whose markers are still there to be seen. (You are not saying that, I know, but there are those who do).

Regards as ever

Mike

Posted: Tue Aug 01, 2006 2:59 pm

I understand what you are saying and admittedly there is a difference between an organised last stand and the final resistance shown. Where you draw that line is a fine matter however.
No doubt the last men in deep ravine offered litle resistance, indeed it seems that they were gripped by blind panic - i.e. running towards the Indian village!
Without doubt in my mind, is the fact that Custer's little band was the last serious organised resistance before the final collapse began.
Emotions felt by these men and the men in the camp at Isandlwana must have been remarkably similar - overwhelmed, outnumbered and knowing that there was nowhere to run to to escape the end.

Graham