rorkesdriftvc.com :: View topic - Lt.Col.E. Durnford's letter to the "Times" 23-1-80

Posted: Sat Aug 29, 2009 5:56 pm

Lt. Col. Edward Durnford's letter to the "Times" on the first anniversary of Isandlwana
On the first anniversary of Isandlwana 1-22-80 the London "Times" published an article on the massacre. Edward Durnford took issue with many of the "Times" assertions and wrote a letter to the editor the next day in response and in refute. I am not certain if Durnford's letter was actually put in the Times. In my collection, I have his copy of this letter. Here is a transcript and if anyone would like a scan of the original, please email me privately. Ron Sheeley
To the Editor of the "Times" 23-1-80
Sir
My attention has just been called to an article in your issue of yesterday-the anniversary of �Isandhlwana�.
I beg leave to point out some important inaccuracies in your short-description of the battle. The Native Horse were not supported by a company of regulars nor was such a detached company �surrounded, outnumbered, & cut-to-pieces�.
The The Native Horse moved out-2 troops to reconnoitre the hills to the left front of the camp, & 2 troops direct to the front. Colonel Durnford accompanying the latter. A company of the 24th was posted on the hills to the left of & about 1200 yards from the camp, & on the Zulu army moving unexpectedly to the attack, this company was reinforced by another, but in a few minutes the whole were ordered to retire, & did retire eventually to the spot chosen for the defensive line which was about 300 yeards in advance of the left, & extended (at a slight angle) across the (page 2)
front of the camp, which was about half a mile in extent. This spot afforded the only cover that was to be obtained; the camp as it stood being absolutely indefensible.
Captain Essex� account of the movements of the 24th is very clear & detailed, & the report made by Colonel Black (who buried the dead of the 24th) completely disproves every accusation that a detached company was cut to pieces. The troops to appear to have been in line when drawn up for the final stand.
The concentration contemplated was not �within the camp�, where there was no possible �vantage ground�, but on rising ground to the right, where those who made the last gallant stand, covering the only line of possible retreat, fell.
The causes of the disaster were plainly (page 3) the fatal situation selected for the camp, enclosed as it was on three sides by hills in the absence of all defensive precautions, the absence of proper scouting, whereby 20,000 Zulus were enabled to approach on the 21st (their mounted scouts being actually seen on the Ngquatu sic hills by the General & Staff on that day, when it was intended on the next to make a reconnaissance in that direction),-the absence of proper communications with the camp, & neglect of warnings; & finally the recall of a force actually on the march to the relief of the attacked camp.
Over these causes of disaster the officers who fell at Isandhlwana had not control; nor can it with any justice be said that they were tempted by �contempt (page 4) for a native African soldiery� to throw away any �advantages� they possessed.
They fought under circumstances almost without parallel--did their duty- & knew how to die like British soldiers.

I am Sir your obedient servant,

Edward Durnford
Lieut Colonel

Posted: Sun Aug 30, 2009 12:39 pm

Ron

Thankyou very much for posting the transcript of Edward's letter.

I'm not sure how many originals of Edward's letters from the time (post-Isandlwana) still exist, as he wrote several others to important figures, regarding Isandlwana and the defence of his brother.

I'd reckon, such handwritten letters, if not destroyed, must exist in archives somewhere, the contents of some (all?) appearing in his book 'A Soldier's Life And Work'.

Thanks again

Coll

Posted: Mon Aug 31, 2009 9:30 am

Ron

Many thanks for transcribing this letter for us. Unless I am mistaken, it was never published. I wonder whether it is - rather than his own copy - an unposted letter (unless clearly indicated as his copy?) or whether it appeared elsewhere.

Later in the year, Chelmsford presented his own account of the battle to the House of Lords (18th Aug) which appeared in The Times the following day. Again, Lt-Col Edward Durnford objected to this account and, on the 21st, wrote another (considerably longer than his first) letter to the editor. This time it was published (on 23rd) and at least one other letter from the public appeared that week, also rejecting Chelmsford's account. Chelmsford, although reluctant to enter into a public debate, responded immediately, but Durnford would not be shaken off and fired off another, also published a day or so afterwards. The arguments, of course, are the same as those he used in his own privately published pamphlet.

Peter

Posted: Mon Aug 31, 2009 11:19 am

Peter,

It has been published in The Journal of the Anglo-Zulu War Research Society (unlimited), we also reproduced The Times piece which caused Edward Durnford to put pen to paper.

In haste - busy today!

John Y.

Posted: Tue Sep 01, 2009 8:38 am

...and without naming names, yet still pointing the figure in the right direction, it pretty much sums the whole thing up, apart from giving credit to Zulu bravery (which might have been just a bit too much for the still-grieving soldiers' families).

Posted: Wed Sep 02, 2009 1:16 pm

Thanks, John - and also to Ron, for the scanned copy received.

I find it slightly puzzling that The Times didn't publish his January letter. Other correspondence generated by the 22 Jan article was published, although these letters were fairly non-controversial. Did the editor want to avoid ruffling feathers? Were there any libel issues involved? I doubt it. After all, he allowed them both to go at each other hammer and tong later in the year, and in the spring of that year we also have the vigorous response from Harness to Forbes' criticism of Chelmsford in Fraser's Magazine.

I wonder whether this letter was never posted.

Peter

P.S. Ron has just pointed out that it is clearly marked "Copy" at the top, which I had missed in my hurried look at the scanned version. This means there was another copy, making it more likely that the intended copy was posted.

Posted: Thu Sep 03, 2009 5:55 pm

Like Julian I find myself in broad agreement with pretty much everything Colonel Edward says here, though of course there is also much that he does not touch on - including Colonel Anthony's private battle in the Qwabe valley (thereby unduly extending the duration of his tactical dislocation as the force commander), and, of course, his blatant disregard of the injunction to 'act strictly on the defensive', but, in the latter case, this is an order which we know emanated with Francis Clery, and can hardly serve as a justification to be wielded by those who would exonerate his Lordship.

On the matter of the nature of the ground, however, Edward makes some telling points which the Chelmsford camp so often seek to evade or obfuscate. No 3 Column was not undone by Zulu tactical mobility and use of ground, but by their operational level mobility and use of ground (i.e.. at their manoeuvring at the army/impi level).

I think the real value of this is in its emphatic refutation of any idea that large numbers of soldiers died on the spur. As I and others have always said Essex's account is not open to the sort of ambiguity that some have tried to impose upon it.

Many thanks to Ron for posting this. Most interesting.

Regards

Mike

Posted: Fri Sep 04, 2009 12:36 am

Mike

Can you, possibly for the umpteenth time, give a more detailed explanation about what you say in your post, as in -

'Colonel Anthony's private battle in the Qwabe valley'.

also -

'his blatant disregard of the injunction to 'act strictly on the defensive'.

I've tried my best to be more 'relaxed' about Col. D., but you appear to be using Edward's letter, to confirm that 24th soldiers were not killed on the spur, rather than the whole picture of what he is saying.

As an avid enthusiast for many years now, this seems to me, to be an evasion of the point(s) made in letter, to suit another purpose, regards the 24th.

How can you 'broadly' agree with the letter, but point out something, apparently not mentioned (as if deliberately), but pick up on the comment of 24th soldiers not dying on the spur.

This strikes me as one-sided, using the letter to suit other events.

I look to your good self to correct me on this.

Coll

Posted: Fri Sep 04, 2009 8:56 am

Good morning Mike

As a poor ignorant layman in these matters, would you be kind enough to explain the distinction between "tactical mobility" and "operational level mobility"?

Many thanks,

Paul

Posted: Fri Sep 04, 2009 9:44 am

Coll

At the risk of jumping in here when the question was not directed to me, I think it's fairly clear.

Mike pointed out that he agreed with the main thrust of the letter, which dwelt chiefly on the faulty position and layout of the camp. However, aware that Col Edward was a strong campaigner (quite apart from in this particular letter) on his late brother's behalf, and perhaps conscious that his agreement here with Col Edward on the point of the camp might suggest to the unaware that he may be in broad agreement with all of Col Edward's protestations (which, as you and we all know, he patently isn't), he added the caveat that Col Edward's letter made no mention of what Mike and others consider Durnford's major errors on the day, viz: his perceived disobedience and his decision to fight far from camp, which - as you'll recall - have been gone into in some detail many times.

The mention of the lack of major 24th casualties on the spur by Mike (the myth of the "missing company") was, I think, merely an aside which drew attention to another incidental attribute of the letter, it's clear refutation of the idea that large numers of the 24th had died well to the north.

In Col Edward's campaign, in which he included matters which supported his brother but omitted those which didn't, it is almost inevitable that he'd get some things right and others wrong. Which was which, of course, is not necessarily established yet!

Peter

Posted: Fri Sep 04, 2009 11:52 am

Peter E

Yes. I understand what you're saying, but it works the other way, as in, the knowledge of Edward's role/campaign has been supplied on the forum many times, including the opinions against it.

It is highly unnecessary to include such negative details, yet again, when they are uncalled for in this topic, but then highlight the detail about the 24th companies. This is one-sided, putting in a point(s) again, to lower people's estimation of the man, but keen to let it be known that his point about the 24th was confirmed.

Edward's letter, which some seem to be unfeeling about, even though the man tells it 'like it is', are using it for other gains against his brother, by adding another reminder of the so-called mistakes.

To me, that adds insult to injury, using a topic about Anthony's brother's letter, to point out the incident with the 24th, but criticise him, did I say, yet again ?

These comments are unwelcome, when presented on every given opportunity, when I myself have been criticised for trying to oppose them as best I can, but considered as the one who appears to start the arguments.

There is much written, that I feel is a 'finely-tuned machine of untruth', which I'll constantly throw a spanner into, rather than allow it run freely, with no opposition.

I'm well aware of how annoying I can be, but when I feel an injustice is done and being continued, it is not possible to let go.

I must add, that I'm not a youth, but old enough to know such things, especially when they don't ring right, although my postings probably aren't convincing, making me look knowledge-wise like David against Goliath.

However, David did defeat Goliath !

Coll

Posted: Fri Sep 04, 2009 4:06 pm

Good for you Coll. Expand upon what Edward said not what was unsaid. What was deliberately left unsaid may not have been known.

Posted: Fri Sep 04, 2009 8:49 pm

Coll

It's perfectly clear. Exactly what Peter said.

The E. Durnford letter is right in the points it makes, but paints only half a picture, (something which should always be brought out in the study of history), presenting as it does only the case against the general. I'm certain Ron Sheeley, who takes his history very seriously let me tell you, didn't post it with the idea of excluding all but devoted A. Durnford worshippers from making observations on its contents, so let's dismount from that particular high horse shall we. This is not durnfordvc.com nor coll.com

I have contended that because war is waged on both the operational level (the conduct of wars and campaigns by generals and formations) and the tactical level (the conduct of battles by the tactical commander and his troops) that the contentions 1. Durnford was to blame. 2. Chelmsford was to blame. are inevitably over simplistic if not downright trite. The history and interpretation of events at Isandlwana bogged down on this fault-line for more than a century. What I am trying to get across is the true complexity of the real event, in military terms, and likewise the complex interactions of the real people, some of whom committed such cardinal military sins that it is as plain as day that they were not terribly good soldiers.

Now, you evidently sit squarely in camp 2, and you my friend, in my (long) considered opinion, are wrong. The truth is that they were both to blame, but for different things, at different levels of command, which together combined to bring about the disastrous outcome of 22 Jan.

If you would like to present a coherent argument to counter two very mild observations I have made I suggest you justify why it was necessary to fight in the Qwabe Valley instead of concentrating in haste on the camp, and that you repudiate my contention that the force at Isandlwana was under orders to act 'strictly on the defensive'. You might also like to describe how precisely four troops of native horse, two companies of NNC and 2 x 9-pdr rocket troughs, subdivided into two entirely separate tactical groupings, might have achieved any sort of tactical advantage, in the open, against an enemy force known (for three to four hours) to be at least several thousand strong and well concealed in difficult ground. Then you need to deal with why Col Pulleine stood to in in front of the tents during the 8.05 alarm, when he was in command, but was forced by circumstance to fight a kilometre and more into the plain when Colonel Durnford was in command.

Quite why your raging about me mentioning E. Durnford's analysis on the withdrawal to the northern sector of the firing line is completely lost on me. I think it's important and I think a lot of others will be interested in the point even if you are not. E. Durnford did a lot of contemporaneous research into the form and sequence of the battle in much the same way as say Symons. He had the advantage of conversations and exhanges of letters with those who were there or nearby - so his view on this point is of interest and importance. The contention that something bad happened on the Tahelane Spur is a red-herring. In my view any vaguely authoratative source, such as this one, which further helps repudiate a misinterpretation of the available evidence might finally help sway the debate and so needs to be emphasized, if ground truth is ever finally to be established/agreed.

It is neither appropriate nor reasonable that Colonel Durnford's inept performance as the tactical commander in one of the most complete military disasters ever to befall Her Britannic Majesty's forces should be the subject of any sort of whitewash. Young enthusiasts and history students read these posts and I am, I promise you, absolutely determined to prevent you propagating a skewed and entirely na�ve version of history. Durnford must shoulder his share of the blame but - as I have said repeatedly - he is not the only culprit and he died bravely. The battle was not winnable but it should have been survivable for the regulars, with their heavy fire potential, even if the less capable irregular components had been scattered to the four winds around them. But even so unambitious an outcome as this proved impossible and the reason for it was the AWD imposed dispersal of forces.

Paul

The point I'm making is that the key to the Zulu success was their manouevre at the army level, in.....

1. Getting 25,000 men from Ulundi to within 5 miles of the camp undetected.

2. Striking across a five mile frontage in such a cogent fashion and with such rapidity as to achieve perfectly timed double envelopment of the entire enemy force and his consequent destruction in detail.

.....as opposed to any of the more limited (in scale and scope) manouevres at the regimental level which took place in contact with the British in the Isandlwana bowl - what one might call tactical mobility, or perhaps more accurately, tactical manoeuvre.

Regards

Mike

Posted: Fri Sep 04, 2009 11:21 pm

Thanks, Mike.

(1) My enquiry wasn't a challenge to your perceptions: merely a request for a definition for the ignorant layman (such as myself) of the technical military terms you used. Your explanation is most helpful - thank you.

(2) Following on from your reply to Coll - and again, without any 'side' to the question - to what extent, in your opinion as a tactician and an historian, did the Zulu gain the victory at Isandhlwana, as opposed to the British losing the battle through poor leadership?

Posted: Sat Sep 05, 2009 12:56 am

Mike

With respect, but no sir !

Your opinion is yours alone, for all you can give a detailed explanation in words, and many at that, doesn't make you right. First of all, your beginning paragraph sets the scene, as in, the ridicule you present forth as your first argument, is below you Mike, as a professional military man, historian and author. I'm disappointed. This is not right !

You are wanting Durnford to share Chelmsford's blame ! Shame on you sir, as No.2 Column followed on from No.3 Column, so why shouldn't Col. D. assume that all is clear, enough so, for Chelmsford to advance with half his force, whilst Col. D. advances his force to Isandlwana !

You are blinding many with your status and the fact that your opinions are in print, which somehow, seems to justify anything you say.

I'm willing to withdraw from the forum Mike, but the saddest thing is, you know I am right, and that Col. D. has been done an injustice, then and onwards from 1879.

You must defend your book and the contents within, I know, but you have lost your way and latched onto the thoughts of those in the 19th Century, rather than accepting the truth.

I respect you Mike, big time, but I'd respect you more if you admitted your mistakes.

Regards as always.

But for the last time, methinks.

I strive only for the truth, Mike, nothing personal.

Coll