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Posted: Sat Feb 03, 2007 7:32 pm

Chris

An interesting question and one which hasn't occurred to me before now. The government department in question would be the Colonial Office rather than the Home Office. The home government was a Tory one under Disraeli which had not long since sanctioned an invasion of Afghanistan in response to the presence of a Russian mission under General Stolietoff in Kabul. This was a function of what had become known as the 'forward policy' devised by Lord Lytton, the Viceroy, so Disraeli's government was not opposed to exercising military options per se. But it would have been reluctant to be fighting a resource intensive war in South Central Asia at the same time as one in Southern Africa. Whether such a government would go so far as to recall the troops after the war in Zululand had actually started I think is a moot point. I suspect not - they probably would have been compelled to back Frere's judgement and to muddle through. Isandlwana gave HMG no choice but to back Frere and Chelmsford at least until the job was done, though Disraeli never forgave either of them. Damian O'Connor will have a view on this (he is a biographer of Sir Bartle Frere, the High Commissioner in the Cape). Theoretically without an Isandlwana, the scenario you postulate is possible, but I suspect on balance unlikely. After all, despite a bit of military overstretch caused by Afghanistan, beating the Zulu was going to be a walk in the park wasn't it...ahem.

Regards
Mike

Posted: Sat Feb 03, 2007 8:46 pm

Chris and Mike

A very interesting thought but wouldn't some sort of Isandlwana have been inevitable? After all King Cetshwayo had already sent out his impis with the express mission of forcing the invaders back into Natal. Surely there would have been a decisive battle at any rate with either the Zulu's losing and the war being virtually won at that point or the British losing with the entire center column (and Durnford's as well in all likelihood) massacred. In the latter case there would have been nothing but air and B Coy between the victorious impis and Natal. ( As was the actual case but if the battle had developed further east there would have been a whole new set of problems for Lts. Chard and Bromhead!) In which case Sir B-F may have been forced to sue for peace on his own (as I believe was Cetshwayo's plan all along.)

Best

Michael

Posted: Sun Feb 04, 2007 4:59 am

Keith,

It is doubtless you were aware of this fact when you reminded the forum that Lord Chelmsford's rank as lieutenant general was only his local rank. However to avoid confusion I would like to cite Mike Snook's "Footnotes in History" section in "Like Wolves on the Fold" which notes, "In 1882 he was confirmed as a lieutenant general......."

Obviously this point is a given for the learned in the forum but for new members and intellectual indigents such as myself Confused

, it is indeed a point that might eventually hinder our further understanding of events.

Thanks and cheers,

Steven

Posted: Sun Feb 04, 2007 12:23 pm

Steven

Both you and Mike are quite right - Lord C. was promoted to substantive lieutenant-general in April 1882. But wait! there's more: he was appointed full general in December 1888 and finally retired from the army in June 1893.

KIS

Posted: Sun Feb 04, 2007 8:59 pm

Chris, Mike

Frere was primarily concerned with the Balkan war and he thought he was sent to the Cape to get it ready for war in the event that the Russians blocked Suez. The chronology is important here. In july 1878 the Berlin Congress "solved" the Balkan crisis but then the Russian mission to Afghanistan arrived at the same time. The Russians were supposed to retreat from Constantinople by May 1879 but their army was commanded by 'Forward School ' officers and Frere simply did not beleive that they would retire. hence his disobedience; sort out the Zulus in January/February and then get back to the Cape for April when the snow in the Balkans melted and the campaigning season began again. Frere was actively looking for a decisive engagement but it did not quite go his way either militarily or politically.

Posted: Sun Feb 04, 2007 9:52 pm

Damian

The points you raise are now being discussed on two threads, so apologies for cross-posting here. Let us assume that you are right about Frere's preoccupation with the Russians, although I have to say that to my mind this raises a whole raft of other historiographical questions which we cannot deal with on this forum. But do you think that Frere thought he would be faced with privateer incursions, or did he fear a more intensive Russian assault on the Cape itself at some point? And if so, what did he think he was going to be able to do realistically to counter it with the resources at his disposal?

In your comments on this subject you seem to be suggesting that the Russian threat to British interests in Sub-Saharan Africa was openly acknowledged and its pre-emption actively considered by key players in Government. This being the case, why do you think Frere did not simply tell Hicks Beach that he should get a grip; remind him that (as everyone knew) the defence of the Southern African colonies against a real and specific Russian threat was the key priority with which he had been entrusted - that this, in fact, was why he had been sent in the first place - and that he, Frere, had to deal with the Zulu 'problem' as a matter of military urgency in order to devote himself to the wider issue, to which end he required from Government the necessaries in order to fulfil this stated objective? Why even bother with the endless correspondence and dodgy casus belli he employs?

Only asking! Confused

Regards,

Paul

Posted: Mon Feb 05, 2007 1:21 pm

Paul,
Good questions indeed. The fact is that Frere, Cunynghame and Chelmsford were all actively engaged in preparing for the defence of the Cape throughout the summer of 1878 and on to February 1879. Similarly, Hicks-Beach, the Admiralty and the War office were all exercised by the problem through the meetings of the Colonial Defence Committeee - H-B generated a blizzard of correspondence on this and Carnarvon took it up in September 1879. The threat was deemed to come from a raid of 2-5000 Russian marines whose aim would be the destruction of coal stocks, port facilities etc which would not result in a lasting occupation but would strike a major blow at imperial prestige. Enter Mehlokazulu, which for Frere was a last straw after all the other border problems and H-B fully supported him until forced into a volte face in October 1878 (this is documented in Worsfold's book). Frere did indeed try to impress upon H-B the urgency of the situation and failing to convince him went ahead anyway.

Next time you are in the Cape have a drink at the Brass Bell on the road to Simonstown - this was where Chelmsford was going to assemble his forces to retake either Cape Town or Simonstown!
Damian

Posted: Mon Feb 05, 2007 2:57 pm

Thanks, Damian - I'll add it to the list of other watering-holes I want to visit next time I'm in South Africa.

All this is most interesting, and I fully intend checking the sources to which you refer. Given what you have argued about Frere's explicitation to Hicks Beach of his concerns re. the Russian threat and of the concomitant need to deal with the Zulu issue precisely because of that, would you be kind enough to save me some leg-work and provide me with archival references to his correspondence with HB where he specifically states what you say?

Given, of course, that no Russian attempt on the Cape of any kind actually materialised - you have to feel that their Marines missed a golden opportunity to '... strike a major blow at imperial prestige' in the aftermath of Isandlwana - one has to wonder whether Frere felt that his efforts were in hindsight justified. Presumably, however, it is reasonable to suppose that Wolseley would have been given the same 'Russian menace' brief as you say Frere and Chelmsford had: does he also specifically refer to the Russians by name in his papers or correspondence after he relieved Chelmsford?

Many thanks,

Paul

PS I am currently working in detail through the footnotes to your recent biography of Frere, and am also ordering a copy of your Masters thesis, which I look forward to reading, in order to gain a clearer understanding of the methods you employed.

Posted: Mon Feb 05, 2007 3:06 pm

boy they're a few threads here in this one place.
...now I'll reply to Steven's post....

Ah not a Monty fan eh? Yes, he was "arrogant, opinionated, self-serving".
(I guess Churchill was too you know?) Montgomery certainly
had those qualities yet I have to think that he was the greatest British general of the war. He was a winner and he did get results and at Alamein he turned the tide of the war. He also made that all important emotional connection I think with the British grunt..yes a soldier's soldier. It's evident that Montgomery did have a tough time in Normandy but I think that it has to be understood that he was facing a top-notch German Army both in materiel and fighting men. It was a slogging match and he duly remembered the Somme. Like Eisenhower, I think he was a genius in leadership and his legacy no doubt exists in the British army today in training, preparedness and professionalism in arms.

As for Chelmsford, really there's not much written about him when you compare him to other British generals. I would like to know more about him much more and I would've have loved to have met him and be a Noggs and interview him on his Zulu War campaign. Why? Because under his watch a British army in the field was destroyed and he came back to resounding victory at Ulundi. Hmmmm..was it him by some sort of inner force in his personality or the indomitable fighting spirit of a British army?
Was it both? Did he have doubts? Perhaps there's an interesting Chelmsford we can get to know that could help us understand the war better. Who knows maybe he too is "arrogant, opinionated and self-serving" and (some other worse stuff?) just like his fellow general Viscount Montgomery of Alamein.

Posted: Tue Feb 06, 2007 5:15 am

Hi Damian -- and other posters,

Really fascinating stuff. We here in SA tend to get carried away with what happened on our own little patch ( and quite rightly so ) But this is the real stuff as far as the bigger picture of the whole British Empire was concerned. What was going on in all the different little corners of the empire at this specific point in time.

Whether "Albion" was perfidious or not. I still have the greatest respect for them -- and sorry to our Americans friends -- seemed to do a heck of a fine job. In the same light whether Milner was perfidious or not his "Kindergarten" also did a very fine job.

But to get back to Frere -- Damian , have you ever visietd Frere in Natal.? Little place just past Estcourt near the N3 highway and the Natal rail mainline. Many moons ago I used to visit a family there with very pretty daughters ( shades of Durnford )-- so the place has good memories for me. Little did I know of the signnificance of the name -- or for that matter Colenso just up the road. Pity when people do not understand the history behind things.

There is a gentleman that runs this site

http://www.ports.co.za

everything to do with shipping in Southern Africa. Who would be fascinated with this part of British history and it's relevance to African maritime history. He would also be able to give you up to date information about "Nacala" and all things maritime as well as ports Southern African.

Chris

Posted: Tue Feb 06, 2007 12:33 pm

Dear Chris,
I think you are right. South African historians have understandably tried to understand how apartheid came about and have looked for its roots in a very noble search. However, I think that it is now time to see how SA related to the rest of the empire. After all, Frere was only one of three proconsuls who started wars without permission (Lord Lytton in Afghanistan and Jervois in Perak) which leads me to suspect that one may be a maverick, two a coincidence but three! This is a movement.

I have been to Frere - but had no luck with the girls.
Damian

Posted: Tue Feb 06, 2007 4:01 pm

Damian O'Connor wrote:

Dear Chris,
I think you are right. South African historians have understandably tried to understand how apartheid came about and have looked for its roots in a very noble search. However, I think that it is now time to see how SA related to the rest of the empire. After all, Frere was only one of three proconsuls who started wars without permission (Lord Lytton in Afghanistan and Jervois in Perak) which leads me to suspect that one may be a maverick, two a coincidence but three! This is a movement.
I have been to Frere - but had no luck with the girls.
Damian

Hi Damian ,
Going way away here -- but as I said walking around with a constant and profound sense of Deja-Vu

I hope that there are still some more of those pro-consols left in the old blighty.

Look here

http://www.newera.com.na/page.php?I'd=907

Warm Reception for Hu Jintao
Tuesday, 6th of February 2007

By Chrispin Inambao

WINDHOEK

President Hu Jintao, his wife Liu Yongqing and their entourage were greeted by a riveting beat pulsating from three African drums, pounded by three muscular male performers, and troupes of traditional female dancers forming the Namibian welcoming party yesterday.
------------------------------

I wonder what "Chinese Gordon" would have to say about this.?

[Little aside here -- you may find a little story of mine in there somewhere]

Pity about the lack of luck with the ladies Sad

There are some very pretty ones here. Razz

Chris

Posted: Tue Feb 06, 2007 4:20 pm

Damian

It was my understanding that Lytton cleared his ultimatum with London. Prepared to be corrected but I definitely gained that impression.

As ever

Mike

Posted: Tue Feb 06, 2007 6:21 pm

Damian O'Connor wrote:

one may be a maverick, two a coincidence but three! This is a movement.

Sounds like you think there was more to this than meets the eye, Damian. If so, what do you think this 'movement' would have hoped to achieve?

Regards,

Paul

Posted: Tue Feb 06, 2007 7:34 pm

Hi Mike,
This is one of those 'fine' points. Basically Lytton and the Indian Secretary Salisbury fell out through 1877-8 in such bitterness that when Salisbury went to the Foreign Office in April 1878, Lytton was determined to go his own way regardless - "encephalous abortion" and "exceedingly foul bird" were some of the epithets being flung around in this row. However, Cranbrook, who took over from Salisbury was inclined to let Lytton have his head anyway. The Cabinet ordered him not to move on 15th Sept 1878, but Cranbrook, responsible for drawing up the despatch, made it so vague as to be worthless. Lytton therefore sent the Chamberlain Mission into the Khyber where it was refused passage. At the Cabinet meeting of 25th october 1878 Salisbury