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Posted: Thu Sep 22, 2005 11:36 pm

Julian

The original official name of the mounted men under Durnford's command was the Natal Mounted Contingent, also known as the Natal Native Mounted Contingent. Evidence for this is to be found in several General Orders, e.g. No. 204, dated 22nd November 1878, National Army Museum, 6807/386-26-13; No. 209, dated 28th November 1878, Times of Natal 2nd December 1878; No. 228, dated 18th December 1878, Times of Natal 20th December 1878 (NNMC). This list is not exhaustive.

The first evidence of a Native Horse is to be found in GO No. 53, dated 9th March 1879, Times of Natal, 12th March 1879:

"1. The undermentioned officers are removed from the Natal Native Contingent, and posted as follows:–
Captain S. Hay, 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, to command a squadron of Native Horse, now forming at Krantzkop.
Lieut. Evans, 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment, to command a troop of the same.
Captain Nourse, 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, to command a squadron of Native Horse, now forming at Lower Tugela.
Captain Cooke, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Regiment, to command a Troop of Horse, (non-commissioned officers of Natal Native Contingent), now forming at Lower Tugela, and Lieutenant Ellis, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Regiment, to be Lieut. in the same.
Captain Ulick de Burgh, 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment, to command a Troop of Horse, (non-commissioned officers of Natal Native Contingent), now forming at Krantzkop.
Lieuts. Horatio Morant, and J.W.E. Purchas, 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment, to be Lieutenants in the same."

It is clear from Paul Thomson's book on the NNC (p. 95) that the name was changed to the Natal Native Horse some time after Isandlwana, perhaps as early as February 1879.
KIS

Posted: Fri Sep 23, 2005 2:49 pm

Thank you Keith - I'm extremely grateful.

Posted: Fri Sep 23, 2005 11:11 pm

Julian

You're welcome! Perhaps you should buy my book of General Orders (D P & G, shameless plug)!
KIS

Posted: Sun Sep 25, 2005 10:12 am

Keith, Send me the details privately and I will.

Posted: Tue Sep 27, 2005 6:22 pm

Dawn wrote:

If we step back a bit, it has to be pointed out that Durnford wasn't supposed to be at Isandlwana in the first place. It was Lord Chelmsford who called him up and then left without precise instructions on what he was to do once he got there.

However, Durnford was a little too eager to get into camp and then take off like a dog off the leash across the plain.

So Coll, although I could take a step inside your tent, I'm afraid I can't stay.

Dawn

Coll, as a new member and one who agree's with you, I would join you in the Durnford tent, not only join you but stay there. A lot has been said about Durnford's behaviour, but i for one would not blame him for the outcome of this battle. My reasons?, Firstly as pointed out he was not even supposed to be there (see above) Secondly, My understanding of his dashing off like a dog off the leash was to protect the rear of Chelmsford's force, having yet established the zulu's intentions. Thirdly, the camps defence was (and in my humble opinion) always was the responsibility of Pulleine. It was (with the exception of the rocket battery) the same force Pulleine was given orders to defend with, it was his orders (Pulleine's) that spread the defenders too thin. Yes Durnford did make mistakes but than the whole war was one big mistake. If blame is to be detatched to anyone for the outcome of Isadlwana it rest soley on the head of Chelmsford. So Coll, put the kettle on, I'm in your tent to stay. Smile

Keith

Posted: Tue Sep 27, 2005 8:31 pm

Could I stay for a cup of tea and let you guys persuade me otherwise?

Durnford's orders were to go to the camp but no further. While the orders were a bit ambiguous and didn't say what he should do when he got there, it didn't mean he could leave either.

I believe that Chelmsford's intentions were for Durnford to strengthen the camp's defence. I'm not defending Lord C, he left the camp undermanned for five or so hours after he left. And I still believe he carries ultimate responsibility for the fall of the camp.

Chelmsford had been gone for some hours and he was meeting up with Dartnell to reinforce the men out there. Surely enough to head off an attack? If Lord C was still within sight of the camp and Durnford could see the Zulu behind him, then yes, certainly chase after them. But Durnford could not be certain that the men he saw were after Chelmsford. Furthermore, Durnford left some of his men in the camp. If he wanted to defend Lord C then surely he should have taken his full force.

Dawn

Posted: Wed Sep 28, 2005 8:42 am

And so we come back to the fact that Chelmsford's statement that the last two orders to Durnford should be 'read together' so that his intentions were clear...and the question as to whether Durnford DID read them as one...and then there's the ambiguity in Crealock's note about "move up here" - did he mean the Mangeni rather than Isandhlwana...'blame' can only be attached if Durnford deliberately went against orders; if he misinterpreted them through no fault of his own, wherein does the blame lie...at Durnford's door or Chelmsford's?

Posted: Wed Sep 28, 2005 3:19 pm

This may appear to be the easy option that I'm going for, but believe me, I've given the matter of Isandlwana an incredible amount of thought over the years.

The allocation of blame to anyone (Durnford. Pulleine.) on the battlefield at Isandlwana I think is unfounded. Both had orders which were either unclear or impossible to carry out due to the developing situation arising at the camp.

If anything, I believe Durnford and Pulleine, as well as the men under their immediate commands were let down by those in authority, before the battle started, during the battle itself and in the aftermath, when it was easier to blame those killed in the process of obeying their duties to the best of their abilities.

I can't fault anyone involved at Isandwana, in decisions or actions taken during a battle against overwhelming odds, trying to accomplish a task ( defence of the camp) when there was no way the camp's depleted force could hold a large area against an attack of such magnitude, only with the hope of inflicting casualties of such a scale within the enemy's ranks, that the Zulus may have stalled, before finally withdrawing, unwilling, or unable to sustain so many dead and injured amongst their army.

It has been said in the old forum there may have been the thought (by Durnford at least) that if he was going to die, he was going to take as many of the enemy with him as possible. What else could he do ?

No help was coming, there was nowhere to go, but there was a way to deplete the Zulu army enough, to lessen the threat (within reason) to Chelmsford's force.

Yes. An incredible, yet heroic sacrifice, but there were no alternatives.

When the battle at Isandlwana was over, the Zulu army was absolutely blown, the losses amongst their regiments were considerable.

Did Durnford, Pulleine and the men under their command accomplish anything in their demise ?

Yes. Although the camp finally fell, the Zulus didn't capture it easily. Also, Chelmsford was able to withdraw from Zululand, his own command which had left the camp, remained unscathed, nothing to oppose him or block his path during his retreat.

Chelmsford made the mistake(s), Durnford, Pulleine and their men paid the price, and a huge price that was.

Everybody who fell at Isandlwana did their duty well and bravely.

Blame ? Well I think you have to look beyond the battlefield to find the culprits, and I know who is top of the list.

Just my opinion. Can I back it up ? No. Doesn't make me wrong, or right for that matter, but in my view I'm content with my conclusions.

Is my judgement too easy, too tidy, too obvious to be true ?

Possibly, but sometimes we overlook what is right in front of us.

Am I chosing the most uncomplicated scenario in order for me to understand it, or justify my defence of Durnford, as well as those who died with him on the battlefield ? I don't think so.

I know we have to find out what the different events leading up to the battle were, and the incidents that occurred during it. But blame for the disaster ? Again, as far as I'm concerned, nobody on that battlefield should have the finger pointing in their direction.

Coll

Posted: Wed Sep 28, 2005 6:10 pm

Again Coll i find myself in total agreement and will only add the following. By commiting a school boy error by dividing his force without knowing the enemy's strength or disposition it was Chelmsford himself whose shoulders bare the most blame (If anyone acted like Custer that fateful day it was he) To pour blame onto the brave soldiers who died was an unforgivable act, Durnford's actions that day have been used as a smoke screen to hide the incompetance of senior officers and inept staff work.

In order to prove this point one only has to answer the following questions.

The 24th were not an inexperienced battalion and the problems concerning the ammunition boxes must have been reported before the 22nd Jan......What was done about it?

As stated above Chelmsford split his force, Does it really need 50% of a fighting force to establish a new camp site?

We know the reasons why Chelmsford did not entrench or laager at Isandlwana.......But it is indefensible that the vedettes and pickets were not thrown out further in order to give time for the camp to take up stronger defensive positions.

Chelmsford knew that Durnford would have arrived at Isandlwana by the time his order to strike camp was sent.....Why was this order not addressed to Durnford as senior officer?

I am not saying Pulleine and Durnford did not make mistakes, clearly they did, but to blame the dead was the easy option. Chelmsford and his staff were not up to the task and nothing will move me from this stance, the death of the Prince imperial should have sounded there replacement and charge's made against them for incompetance.

Swanny........still in Colls tent.

Posted: Sun Oct 02, 2005 12:04 am

Durnford and Pulleine possibly made a few mistakes, but in my view this only happened as a result of them trying to correct the major mistakes made by Chelmsford, who threw professionalism out of the window, misjudging the Zulus and not crediting them as a worthy opponent, so much so, he ignored military procedure, forming a large defenceless camp, with the surrounding area unsecured, and taking away half the force, leaving the camp also undermanned.

As I say, major mistakes were made, but by Chelmsford himself, Durnford and Pulleine just happened to 'inherit' them after he left.

Pulleine was put in charge of a camp he was convinced was secure and Durnford arrived probably expecting all precautions had been taken by Chelmsford, before leaving.

I don't think Durnford doubted Chelmsford's ability initially, but he certainly got his eyes opened when he arrived at Isandlwana and saw just how exposed the camp was to enemy attack.

It would have occurred to Durnford at that very moment, knowing the Zulus as he did, Chelmsford was approaching this campaign wrongly, as in, underestimating the Zulus, making Chelmsford careless and less cautious, not taking the threat seriously.

Although I'm only an amateur enthusiast, I do feel Durnford understood Zulus well enough, to send 2 Troops, rather than just a few riders, onto the ridge, in the event of them confronting even just a small force of Zulus, so that they could conduct a fighting withdrawal (as they did) or cut their way through any attempted encirclement. However, his intention was to push the warriors away from the camp, rather than actually just scouting the area.

There is absolutely no way, no way at all, that Durnford could have expected the whole Zulu army to be so close to the camp. Why should he ? Nobody else did. A professional soldier he was, but he was only human too. At least he had the sense, more than Chelmsford, to search the ridge for any groups of Zulus and removing them from the area.

He was one of the few (very few) senior officers acting like a true professional on that day.

I am an admirer of Durnford, but it does appear to be creating an opinion of 'hero worship' on my part, although I can understand why, I think, it is more serious, in the fact I truly believe there was an injustice done in the aftermath of Isandlwana, regarding Durnford's reputation and the role he played in the battle itself.

I wish there was a way I could debate the issue more convincingly, but I really will have to study my AZW books in-depth, to be able to accomplish such a task.

I know I'm repeating myself, but as this is a new forum, I thought I'd just confirm my views haven't changed. If anything they are stronger.

Coll

PS. Swanny - Glad you're staying.

Posted: Sun Oct 02, 2005 6:45 am

Coll
When you say was anything accomplished, there is a rather important yes. That is according to Zulu testimony that although they knew they had won at Isandhlwana they also knew that they would lose the war.
Swanny
There was no problem with the ammunition boxes.
50% of the force out with Chelmsford was not there for siting the new camp. It was to attack the Zulu force on the Mangeni.
In enemy country the picquets were considerably far-flung. How much further would you have flung them?
The camp orders were given to the senior officer remaining in camp. These were shown to Durnford on arrival (cf Cochrane). All correct procedurally.
Coll
You write that Durnford's eyes were opened on arrival by the exposed camp layout but then he proceeded to 'expose the layout even further'. Perhaps his eyes were shut on arrival?
To send 2 troops on to the plateau when the reports suggested several thousand Zulus on there was a wise move?
All things to think about.

Posted: Sun Oct 02, 2005 9:56 am

I'm with Julian. Didn't Durnford compound Chelmsford's mistake by splitting his own force, sending some up to the spur and himself off across the plain?

Would Durnford have been able to defend the camp if he had stayed? This was mentioned before but not expanded on. I would like to think that he might have been able to recognise the 'horn' formation before Pulleine and arrange a defence accordingly. That may or may not have saved the camp and therein would have been the true heroism. Instead he flung his forces too wide, left the field exposed and had to beat a retreat to a last desperate stand.

At the end of the day, however, Durnford was a domino in a long line of dominos that Chelmsford set tumbling and Durnford alone cannot carry the blame for the fall of the camp.

Dawn

Posted: Sun Oct 02, 2005 11:04 am

Julian/Dawn

As I am an amateur, I do make amateurish comments.

However, although I thought I had 'painted myself into a corner' after posting the above reply last night, I'm not sure I did.

Durnford had to know what was up on the ridge and the only way was to use the most mobile force, under his own command.

I don't think he exposed the camp further, as he was attempting to remove any threat from the surrounding area.

Even if there was mention of thousands of warriors, it was obviously not considered to be the whole army. If it had been a few thousand and they still had responded to being discovered, attacking the less defended camp, Durnford's mounted forces and Pulleine's firing line would have held them, causing enough casualties amongst the Zulu ranks for the attack to fail.

This method was used on the actual day, but unfortunately, it was the whole army, too many warriors to be held, enough to outflank and encircle the British forces, whereas if it was only a few thousand, they wouldn't have been able to accomplish such a manouevre, unless spreading themselves very thinly to cover the area containing the camp and it's defenders, therefore losing all the strength of their numbers, the firing line depleting their army, rapidly weakening it at various points, breaking the momentum.

Judging by reading a combination of AZW books over the years, there is a strong feeling Durnford should have known how to do everything on his arrival at Isandlwana, even though Chelmsford had failed to do even the basic military procedures to protect the camp and secure the surrounding areas.

I'm sorry Julian, but 'eyes shut on his arrival' ?

Well, considering the views of what it is thought Durnford should have known and did, this wouldn't have been a problem, as in, we might as well say he had x-ray vision too.

He wasn't a superhero who always knew and did the right thing, but on the day he did a great deal more than his superior, it was just unfortunate he discovered the whole army, but it wasn't his fault they were there.

Chelmsford knew Durnford had proceeded to do what he himself should have done and also the Zulus had outsmarted him and he didn't like it.

2 aspects of probably several that caused him to lose face, but was he going to admit it ? No.

This is when blame was allocated, but not to him.

Yes. Durnford and Pulleine fought the battle and lost, but they weren't to blame for the defeat. The Zulu Commanders won the day, outwitting Chelmsford and attacking the less defended camp.

Coll

Posted: Tue Oct 11, 2005 1:39 pm

Keith,
Back to the original question. I've now found references to Natal Native Horse and NNH in The Times of Natal 24th January and the Natal Mercury 25th January. I cannot believe that in the mayhem after Isandhlwana, officers would have been bothered about making an official name-change from NNMC to NNH. It can only have happened BEFORE Isandhlwana and that the units engaged at that battle would have been officially Natal Native Horse.
The last date you have referring to this unit as NNMC is 20th December 1878 - one month before the battle in which a name-change could have occurred.
I'm still delving for a pre-Isandhlwana NNH reference!

Posted: Tue Oct 11, 2005 11:02 pm

Julian

I have now done a thorough search of my documents for both NNMC and NNH. The results will confuse, rather than enlighten.

NMC/NNMC
There are two post Isandlwana references in General Orders: Cochrane appointed, GO 32, 12 Feb, and GO 59, 18th March. There are also references in the newspapers, often simply as "Mounted Contingent", cf., Witness, 30th Jan. and Mercury, 22st Jan. and 1st and 17th Feb.

NNH
There are many references here but a couple are significant. Both Raw and Davies, in their Isandlwana statements, refer to their unit as the NNH!
Further, Cochrane himself, in a statement of 4th March, refers to his unit as the NNH, (WO 33/34, Inclosure 10 in No. 96., 4th March). E.S. Browne refers to them with regard to Capt. W. Barton, dated 12th Feb, in WO 32/7387 (Wassall VC), as does Barton himself, (ibid, dated, 11th Feb.). There is also a Return of Troops in the Field showing those at Kranskop dated 6th January, in which they are referenced (PAR, CSO 681, signed by Durnford). See, finally, PAR, CSO 1926, No. 681, a report by J.E. Fannis (at Kranskop) dated 31st Jan.

I now simply would not be able to say just when, or even if, a change of name actually and officially, occurred.
KIS