rorkesdriftvc.com :: View topic - The Rorke's Drift Wake-Up Call

Posted: Thu Jul 20, 2006 4:35 am

I'm trying to get the sequence of events (and other things) ordered in my mind.

After Lt. Chard returned to the depot and informed Maj. Spalding of what he had witnessed and why he'd returned so hastily (i.e. - afraid the Zulus might be having a go at his ponts) [ the only one, by the way, who seems to have attributed any purpose at all to the witnessed westward Zulu deployments by my reckoning, except for Col. Durnford who as well thought they may be raiders and sent one of his horse troops back to reinforce his waggons.] Maj. Spalding then left to hurry on Capt. Rainforth. This would be about 1400? Meanwhile Capt. Gardner, the only surviving Imperial officer who seems to have thought of it, was writing a note at Fugitives' Drift to warn RD what had happened and what to expect ( the note apparently said 'strengthen and hold the post at all costs', which would seem a bit cheeky for a Capt. to send to the Maj. presumed to be there, particularly given the current state of affairs), the note being sent via an Edendale trooper who was at that time defending that drift (or am I over-deducing that?). Would this be around 1300?

Now I get more confused. By the time Chard was talking with Adendorff and the Carbineer down by the drift two other riders, IMI from what I gather, had already shown up at the post and by the time Chard got back up there the note was there but he makes no mention of the Edendale man. Would this be around 1445 maybe? Now Chard, Lt. Bromhead and Commissary Dalton hash some things out, Chard goes back to the ponts to bring up the men there and returns by his reckoning at 1530. Had anyone else wandered along by this time? Shortly afterward Lt. Henderson and his troop(s) of Durnford's horse show up and accept orders to perform vedette duty for the post (other than Adendorff the only troops to offer any support). At this point 'several' other fugitives stop by and interupt the entrenchment work before continuing on there way. Although English speakers Chard kindly offers no other indications of their identities only to say none were H.M. officers (all of whom seemed to have decided that Helpmekaar was more in need of defence.) (That's not a dig, after what the survivors saw I doubt they thought that RD could offer more than a speed bump to the perceived Zulu invasion do to it's proximity, which is why I find Gardner's note all the more prescient.)

Then at around 1620 the Zulus seem to have come within carbine range of Henderson and his men (around 100 by Chard's reckoning, meaning two troops who cohered) who linger only a short time before deciding that going through this twice in one day would not just be tempting fate but spitting in it's eye thus also decide Helpmekaar is the place to be at which point Henderson stops by and makes his apologies to Chard, apparently the only one of all the fugitives that day to do so.

(Not sure if the RD stores even had carbine ammo. Chard says they'd pretty much shot up the lot of what they did have by sun up and although rifles can cook carbine rounds with only a loss of muzzle velocity and extra casing sticks, carbines capping rifle rounds present a much more serious risk, not only to the shooter but those around him.)

At any rate, as you can see, I'm still into my 'forest and the trees' thing, any illumination offered is as always greatly appreciated.

Thanks

Michael

Posted: Fri Jul 21, 2006 1:01 am

You seem to be doing very all right on your own, Michael, without any help from anyone else.

I don't know that times were uppermost in the defenders minds when they were preparing to defend. I've read one book that disputes some of the times that Chard makes in his report. I would imagine time would have pretty much telescoped until no one knew what time it was. Chards report was written after the event obviously and so some of the stated times might have been his perception looking back at it all.

And how do you do with the timing of Revs Smith and de Witt on Shiyane?

Dawn

Posted: Fri Jul 21, 2006 5:50 am

That's just it Dawn, I'm reading the same things everyone else is as far as I can tell but I'm coming up with seemingly different conclusions. I'm hoping that working on time lines can help me sort things out (Keith's article and Mike's book have been helping). Last year there was an editorial in a State-side military mag impuning both Lt. Chard and Lt. Bromhead (and the other VC awardees), based apparently on certain recent revisionist's works, that I desperately wanted to refute but was unable to come up with any contemporary references to them that could counter the outlandish and unfounded opinions of Sir Garnet. Alternately I'm hoping that working through what they knew, when they knew it and what they did in response can offer an explanation that provides evidence that they not only performed their duty as expected but actually went well beyond what should be expected of subalterns in the most unique situation ever faced by the British Army and that they and their troops unquestionably earned the VCs awarded. (A position certainly not in question here.)

As well I'm trying to show that Durnford's Horse deserve a better rap than they've received. They were not held in particularly high esteem (to be diplomatic about it) before the invasion and their actions after Isandlwana have certainly been called into question. They were not the first force in history to have there morale shattered by the death of their beloved commander but at least three of Durnford's troops continued the fight to some degree even after the disaster ( the two troops with Henderson and the Edendale at Fugitives' who don't even seem to have been acting under the command of an officer) where there doesn't seem to be any evidence of anyone else doing so (RD excepted of course!)

Because we know today that the action was not an invasion, or more specifically a counter-invasion, seems to blind many to the fact that to those on the spot a counter-invasion seemed in fact to be happening. In fact that seems to be Lord Chelmsford's only real concern as he seemed to discount any chance of a Zulu impi proving a threat to even half a column, he was only worried about the Zulus getting behind him unchecked. No one at the time knew the religious ramifications of battle would preclude the Zulus from pressing an offensive and that they were in fact checked at Isandlwana or that King Cetshwayo forbade them from invading Natal. There were certainly no indications of that on 22/23 Jan 1879.

I feel that the events of the day have been judged by the wrong 'woulda, coulda, shouldas' and while I'm at a temporary impass for that morning I'm trying to push on to that afternoon and perhaps work it from both directions. (If only they'd employed "watch-bodies" then times would have been clearer!)

Not sure what to think about the sky pilots (not derogatory, an affectionate military slang term even in Britain- http://www.royalmarinesbands.co.uk/reference/Slang.htm ) they were both civilians unsure of what they were seeing and by the time they got back down the game was already afoot and I'm not sure what effect their observations had but closer timing there would also be helpful. I'd like to know more about the Sgt's excursion up the hill earlier and what times are associated with the gun fire heard.

Of course no one was thinking anything untoward so times would have little impact on them nor would actual time of day then have anything like the relevance it has today. But hey, it's something to follow up!

Best

Michael

Posted: Fri Jul 21, 2006 9:16 am

Michael,

I know I'm not adding anything by way of a reply to your original point, but I beg to differ that both the sky pilots were civilians.

The Reverend George Smith's name appears in Army List of 1878, as an officer of the Mooi River Troop of the Weenen Yeomanry, albeit as the Hon Chapl. as his entry records. Smith's association with the local volunteer forces dates back to the Langalibalele Uprising, so he had been with 'the colours' since 1873. Unfortunately, I don't have the 1873 List to ascertain whether Smith was an officer in the Weenen Yeomanry at its inception.

In my opinion George Smith was as much as of a civilian as a T.A. or National Guard soldier serving their country in present-day conflicts.

John Y.

Posted: Fri Jul 21, 2006 5:34 pm

John, you're quite right of course. (I shouldn't have been listening to Eric Burdon and the Animals last night.) I was aware of Padre Smith's 'honourary' staus and his subsequent official appointment but either way I don't suppose chaplains received the same sort of training as line officers anyway and shouldn't be held to that standard. I of course have nothing but respect and admiraton for him as I have nothing but questions and confusion for Mr. Witt ( I have only read some anectdotes of his subsequent speaking tour that seemed to have raised quite a few eyebrows.) I suppose, having brought this up, that I should declare myself as a Christian (albeit non-demoninational) lest there be any question of bias and in fact owe a large debt to two particular US Navy Chaplains who in a time of need helped me greatly in maintaining what little sanity I can now lay claim to! (Both of whom bore the title of Sky Pilot proudly.)

[I really need to work on my digressions!]

At any rate I am trying to flow chart the timing of that twenty-four hour period and so far the many direct and indirect accounts from the camp at Isandlwana and Lord Chelmsford's foray are all over the board and I'm just hoping I can tighten it up a bit with the accounts from RD. I realise that this has all been done before to one degree or another but often in pursuit of supporting conclusions whereas I'm attempting to do it 'clean' and leaving whatever conclusions can be drawn until later.

Best

Michael

Posted: Sun Jul 23, 2006 2:16 pm

Michael

Regarding Durnford's Horse, I'm not sure if much would have been known about them, if anything at all, had it not been for Isandlwana. Even then, as we know, they blocked the 'door' slowing the Zulu army's advance, although it may be said by some, that Durnford 'opened the door' in the first place ! Rolling Eyes

Then, of course, criticism of them leaving the battlefield.

I don't wish to start another Durnford topic, but I do feel because he was a controversial figure, possibly considered a 'No' man instead of a 'Yes' man, speaking out at times, (not always the best idea) especially to superior officers, as well as in charge of an independent native force, that somehow they were always going to get a raw deal.

However, my comments on Durnford are very tiresome and repetitive, so I can't say anything more, apart from the usual, so best avoiding instead.

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