rorkesdriftvc.com :: View topic - Isandlwana

Posted: Mon Oct 16, 2006 6:36 pm

Further to the above.

As I can't give specifics, such as time scale, etc., best to assume, in the event of Mangeni being attacked, that Durnford and the additional No.3 Column force had arrived beforehand.

Coll

Posted: Mon Oct 16, 2006 11:43 pm

Peter,
Fair cop, I had overlooked the fact that Lord C intended to scout north. And I guess a force of Zulu of that size, once it had stopped moving, would soon be found. Especially by scouts who were actively looking for it. Both parties were on a collision course, it was just a matter of when.

Sometimes I like to think of what would have happened if the attack was the next day. Where would the players have been then? It's a bit like chess, thinking ahead to where you want your pieces to be and the consequences of them being where you placed them.

Dawn

Posted: Tue Oct 17, 2006 12:15 pm

Coll

Gosh so much to think about. I think there are too many imponderbales to give you a sensible answer without banging on forever.

Crunch points in the what if game are:

What if Dartnell had decided to wdr to camp? No further action at Mangeni. Battle against the full British force on the 22nd if the scout to the NE which Chelmsford had mentioned the previous afternoon actually went ahead - (I agree with Peter here).

What if Dartnell heeded the advice from Browne and Duncombe and told Dartnell he was going back? Is there a blazing row and yet more tension?

What if Lord C had reacted differently at 1.30 a.m. and not gone dashing off to Mangeni. Battle at the camp as above at point of discovery. Chelmsford wins in my view.

What if Durnford had not been called forward and had not scouted the plateau? THEORETICALLY - no battle until am of the 23 rd. Dawn attack by Ntshingwayo on the camp. BUT before you get too carried away with Durnford - the Carbineers were onto the presence of the impi at Ngwebeni and would have ridden onto mabaso Ridge at some point anyway - perhaps 10 mins later than Raw at the most. I have suggested that the sources describe a virtually simultanous discovery of the impi underway by the NNMC on the left and the NC on the right.

What if Ntshingwayo had decided to attack Mangeni and not Isandlwana on the morning of the 23rd? Unlikely. He is in the wrong place and would have to shift position on the night 22/23 Jan.

We could go on and on.

Coll I think there are just too many imponderables to play the what if game
to be honest. The crunch moment that determined the shape of the 22nd of January was 01.30 that morning when Lord C gave the order to prepare a flying column. From that everything else flowed really.

Regards as ever

Mike

Posted: Tue Oct 17, 2006 1:13 pm

Thanks Mike.

I understand what your saying. It was difficult enough for me to write the question, never mind asking someone to try and answer it ! Wink

Coll

Posted: Tue Oct 17, 2006 2:41 pm

can i just say. i think history has told us this again and again. that he split his forces and that he could of saved the camp if he had returned sooner. my personal feelings are no. the way Chelmsford ordered the defence with a man every seven yards apart are just asking for trouble where as if they had three ranks and a small square they could possibly have saved themselves. Chelmsford i fear should have died in the attack with his men as a good general would. the fact he led half his men away just makes me think how the hell did Queen Victoria think so highly of him, they all died anyway so why keep asking the question

mike

Posted: Tue Oct 17, 2006 5:58 pm

Private Barley
What's all this seven yards apart? Where did you get that from? You've not been reading those penny dreadfuls again, have you?

Posted: Tue Oct 17, 2006 8:36 pm

Mike,

The infantry were in skirmishing order, not all 'seven yards apart. Chelmsford did not have a hand in the battle of Isandlwana itself, though he was responsible for the splitting of the column.

The Zulus outnumbered and outmanoeuvred the British. The British line was over extended and, according to Curling, at half strength. While the companies attemtped to fall back, the Zulus caught them off guard and they were massacred. The right horn cut off the line of retreat for all but a few. It was, on reflection, a brilliant victory as opposed to a terrible defeat.

As Mike, said, we could go on forever!!

Cheers,

Glenn

Posted: Tue Oct 17, 2006 8:43 pm

Glenn,
Indeed. a Zulu Victory!

Posted: Tue Oct 17, 2006 10:01 pm

What a book!

Posted: Wed Oct 18, 2006 8:13 am

i saw it on the real isandiwana program though it didn't make sence. why in gods name would you even consider using a skirmish line for goodness sake. its a complete mythilogical idea to use skirmish when a massive horde come at you and still you win. its best against european enemies with guns. i mean look at the battles of 1809 don't they prove the point against a enemy with guns skirmish line is more practical with a horde go with line.

i watch a lot of documentries.

mike

Posted: Wed Oct 18, 2006 9:21 am

Michael

I'll be touching on this in my next two books. Essentially the Victorian Army is caught at this time between what it is observing of European warfare (the defining conflicts being the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and particularly the Franco-Prussian War of 1870) and a completely different mode of warfare being waged in the empire. Thus the infantry drill/tactics book of 1877 is fairly radical, but very much orientated to European Warfare. Only after Isandlwana is there a realisation that breech-loading rifles or no, it might still be necessary to fight in close order with unassailable flanks and rear.

In the particular context of South Africa the general and the troops had just come from fighting the Xhosa where open order firing lines had been successful. The chief failing of Lord C's generalship was to try and fight the last war (9th CF) all over again.

Mike

Posted: Wed Oct 18, 2006 3:00 pm

Mike (Barley),

The British at Isandlwana had to assume skirmish positions in order to cover the massive area of ground. Even this, as we know, was not enough.

As Mike S said, the British were basing their knowledge of the Zulus upon their impressions of the warriors in the Cape. Not a clever move. 'Know your enemy', it's a very sensible maxim, as Mike will tell you.

The British had plenty of cover from which to shoot. Smith-Dorrien recalled how the '24th were laying down covering the camp'.

The 24th took up a more concentrated position when they fell back but it was, sadly, too late.

Glenn

Posted: Thu Oct 19, 2006 12:25 pm

so why not **** the camp and make square on the open plain away from the camp. i mean fine you expect them to come from but at the same time. it'd be wiser to go with defending yourself and your men. i mean come on if you can put out 13 bullets a man. then in two ranks you can do more damage. come on i would've thought 26 bullets a minute would stop the zulu when a line of fifty men are standing there firing 26 bullets a minute at you. plus then you can have the bayonets in a prepared to take cavalry manuver don't kno wot u all think.

mike

Posted: Thu Oct 19, 2006 12:55 pm

Private Barley

"cavalry manuver don't kno wot u all think"

I think you should try "spellcheck" before you post.
This is not a football team supporters chat line.

regards
PRS

Posted: Thu Oct 19, 2006 2:37 pm

I have disconnected private barley for the moment. The recent **** was an automatic intervention. I've altered something else before.
If he wants to contact me for an explanation, I'll be pleased to oblige.