rorkesdriftvc.com :: View topic - Isandlwana

Posted: Mon Oct 02, 2006 1:20 pm

Ladies and Gentlemen,
This question has undoubtedly been posed before, but following Colls post in Jan 2006 'Two battles at Isandlwana' and after reading both Mike Snooks books, I noticed that Mike Snook seems to suggest in one of his books that Chelmsford was very lucky not to have been on the receiving end of two disasters in one day.
My question is, had Chelmsford decided to stay at Isandlwana could the camp still have been overrun, given the extent of the site, the suddenness of the attack and the fact that the Zulus had not yet experienced concentrated volley fire? Also, while Chelmsford had cannon, he does not seem to have had the Gatling guns that appeared to make a very significant difference in the later campaigns.
In other words, could his invasion (and probably his life) have ended on 22nd January 1879?

Posted: Mon Oct 02, 2006 3:01 pm

Hi Paul

I believe that should Chelmsford have chosen not to leave Isandlwana for a few days and the Impi remained undetected, should they have had suprise on their side, the Zulu army could well have massacred the camp on a grand scale. This would have to be a swift and stealthly attack, in a similar vein to Ntombe.

Having said this, however, with the extra companies of Infantry and the other 4 guns as well as many others present, I have no doubt that with this extra punching factor, Chelmsford could have smashed the Impi easily. After all, they were stalled at the actual battle by the fire of the 24th and only the brief lapse in fire to withdraw gave them the time to push forward and cut off the companies from each other.

You can 'What if?' forever and the beauty of History is that no one can prove you're wrong when it's only opinion. Cool

Cheers,

Glenn

Posted: Mon Oct 02, 2006 3:27 pm

Always a good question.

I agree slightly. If Chelmsford did remain in camp the outcome might have been different but not a walk over. I would prehaps move my odds up to 50-50 instead of 80-20 in favour of the Zulu's advantage in the move to attack half on No: 3 column after Chelmsford's departure.

I would have thought that the Zulu reserve held in check at Isandlwana was deployed there to deal with such an event if Chelmsford chose to return to Isandlwana from Mangeni in the midst of the battle. Clearly the Zulu commanders believed they had enough men to attack the whole column in the first place.

That's one thing I find interesting in this battle. All the if's and buts.

Regards,

Jamie

Posted: Mon Oct 02, 2006 3:50 pm

Well I'm not exactly sure if Chelmsford would have been beaten, because If Chelsford had remained win the camp then, he would have got what he had wanted; a full scale battle, so he would have been very cautious of how he fought the battle and also he would have had far more men, he would have had, approximately, if the force had stayed together 4,357 men (not counting officers) and as the majority of the force that had gone with Chelmsford earlier in the day the British forces at Isandlwana would not have been as stretched and far more fire power could have been brought against th Zulus.

But there is also another view. If Zulus had attacked as they had done against Pulleine as they would against Chelmsford then it would be quite possible that Chelmsford would have left one of his flanks open too, he probably would not have made a laager because as he said when it was suggested to him that he formed a lager at Ulundi he turned it down, he said that the Zulus should be defeated in the open. But if he had left the flank open then he would have the luxery of a reserve with the extra troops that he has. Its difficult to say whether or not Chelmsford himself would be defeated or would he have triumphed.

Posted: Tue Oct 10, 2006 1:58 pm

Thanks for your replies, 'what if's' are always interesting topics for discussion!
What prompted the question is that, according to the report in 'Zulu Vanquished', after Khambula a young Zulu officer claimed that had they obeyed the instructions of their leaders they would have overrun the British position, presumably by sheer weight of numbers. Now this may have been bravado or even wishful thinking by that warrior, but it does seem to prove that they really believed they could do it.
I agree with all of you, I think that like Waterloo, it would have been 'A dammed close thing'

Posted: Thu Oct 12, 2006 8:30 am

Just to stir things up a bit...

If Chelmsford had stayed in camp, he would have had no need to call up Durnford. With Durnford out of the equation, there would have been no extended line with the right flank exposed, followed by Durnford's hasty retreat leaving Lt Pope exposed, etc, etc. (I can hear Coll spluttering from here) I'm not saying its all Durnford's fault, as it was all combination of factors that led to the overthrow of the camp. But with Chelmsford in sole charge, with the fight having come to him as he wanted, he might, just might, have been able to form the square he was so fond of and repel the attack. But then, thats a big stretch of the imagination.

And we've been down this road so many times before.

Dawn

Posted: Thu Oct 12, 2006 10:48 pm

Ah, but what a road - the ominous mountain, the spectacular landscape, the white tents, scarlet tunics, oh, and someone mentioned several thousand shields on the skyline, and the plain, and going to the right of the camp and going round the back of Isandlwana. Blimey, the very mention of such gets the imagination going. Of course, in the midst of this you've got very memorable and heroic individuals, who on this day, will fight the fight of their lives, some survive, most die, but all live on in history.

As for ol' Durnford, well what can I say ? I've tried re-evaluating the role he played on the day and still can't waver on my original opinion of the man, his decisions and his actions. (sorry Mike, but I did try Wink

)

Other than the 'What if's ?', maybe there is the 'What for's ?', as in, maybe the Zulus should have been left alone on their side of the river in the first place - no invasion, no battles, no loss of lives - but then we'd be into the political aspect and that is something I try to avoid.

Mind you, if the whole thing never happened, what would have been my main interest ?

So, there's a new 'What if ?'. What if the Anglo-Zulu War 1879 never happened, what would have happened to Zululand, King Cetshwayo himself, or even Durnford - Could we have been reading his memoirs which he wrote in later life, about working with the natives, his engineering work, his politics, etc., etc., or would we have even known who he or any of the rest were if the war didn't happen ?

Coll

Posted: Fri Oct 13, 2006 7:19 am

The 'what if' scenario allows one to speculate using the balance of probabilty argument to support conclusions. Here is a bit of speculative fun.
However, what is not speculation, (should Chelmsford had remained in camp,) was his declared intention to make a reconnaissance to the north at first light on 22 January. Almost certainly Russell would have been tasked with that recce.
Zulu Victory thesis is that the Zulu was already on the move early 22 January. Durnford, of course, is not called up and therefore not present.
Russell (he of not brave of heart to be shortly dispatched to the remount depot)) would surely have made contact at a very early hour. Chelmsford would then have been aware that he was facing the main Zulu force. All regiments of the Zulu army would then be on the advance employing the tacticts used in reality. Chelmsford's actions thereafter are subject to conjecture, no more no less.
He would have possibly ordered Dartnell back or Dartnell, hearing the firing would have returned on his own volition from Mangeni. Dartnell may then have intercepted the Zulu left horn? Critical to the outcome?
Chelmsford would almost certainly have dropped the tents. leaving a clear field of fire.
He would, according to his post battle reports, have put his back against the mountain and fought in a compact manner.
Would he have sent company/ies to Tahelane Ridge? Probably not?
But in deciding his course of action one must remember the British mind set exemplified by Chelmsford, Crealock et al; namely disdain and arrogance for the opposition. This attitude may well have influenced his command making decisions? Conjecture.
With the appearance of the Zulu in strength everywhere other than the rear, the critical question is whether or not Chelmsford would have recognised the seriousness of the threat from the rear, a threat not immediately apparent, and if so, what measures would he have taken or not taken. Depending on that answer would possibly hinge the result of the battle. No matter how compact his position against the hill, it is a fact that an approach in strength from the west of the hill and around, would leave the defenders vunerable with a relatively limited field of fire. The Zulu charge home from short range would possibly allow the defenders no more than a volley or so before the Zulu closed hand to hand.
Again, a question of timing. Prior to the right horn becoming engaged the chest and left horn may well have given up the battle and be in retreat? After all double the rifles in action and add another four 7 pdrs. Add also the regular mounted infantry and Dartnell's force.
The conclusion? If the Zulu right horn co-ordinated their arrival to coincide with the chest and right, a damn close run thing. If not, the war would have been over and no forum!

Posted: Fri Oct 13, 2006 9:07 am

Why not?

In my mind the 'what if' would have to include Dartnell returning the previous evening as ordered. With him still out in front Lord C had little choice but either order him back or send some support. If ordered back at first light (unlikely as Lord C was anxious for any Zulu contact) they could well have been decimated by the left horn while Lord C may have been tempted to advance to the sound of the guns as he doesn't seem to have been anticipating the whole Zulu Army, just the 'two Matayanas" (in spite of intel to the contrary).

Had Dartnell returned the previous evening, leaving 3 Col. intact, the many waggons prepared to return to the drift that morning may well have set off with a mounted escort and perhaps an infantry coy. as well. In which case they could have been "eaten up" by the right horn and tempted Lord C to set off in that direction and Col. Durnford's men (albeit sans Durnford) would still be at the Drift and although I don't know who was left in command there it would be possible that they would have advanced to the sounds of a fight.

Regardless of one's view of Zulu intent the fact could remain that the Zulus sighted historically would still be sighted in this scenario so it would be a question of how Lord C would interpret the historical pot-pourri of reports coming in. Would he have acted differently than Lt.Col. Pulleine? Would he have suspected the whole impi from the same sightings? Based on what was known by the early sightings would he have decided to abandon the hunt and act like prey? (Unlikely to my mind!)

Perhaps he would have sent out his IMI to recce (as Durnford did his troopers) and perhaps they would have precipitated the same result as Raw and Roberts, only earlier in the day. What effect would that have and what previous troop dispositions would that impact?

I wish I could go on but I have to get back to work. My position of course is that Lord C would not have acted on the defensive but would have attacked.

Best

Michael

Posted: Mon Oct 16, 2006 12:13 am

And this scenerio plays out if we adhere to Lock/Quantrill theory (which is not improbable) but changes if we adhere to the arguement that the attack was not to take place until the next day due to there being a new moon that night.

In which case, the Zulus would have launched an early morning attack a day later. Where would the forces have been placed then?

Oh, I love 'what ifs'!

Dawn

Posted: Mon Oct 16, 2006 6:20 am

Hi Dawn,
No, the attack would still have taken place on the 22nd simply because Russell's mounted recce would have located them. (Chelmsford's declared intent to recce the north on the 22nd morning)
Peter

Posted: Mon Oct 16, 2006 3:08 pm

Very interesting..I tell you if I was a betting man I'd give the Lord some creedence in his defensive prowess if and when he'd have to wait for the onslaught from the Zulu. I know Chelmsford as all commanders at times made mistakes but I just have to believe (that is I guess I want to! that he'd handle the Zulus with tremendous destructive fire. Conjecture: the Zulus would have it tough counting Isandhlwana as a win when attacking the Lord.

Posted: Mon Oct 16, 2006 3:31 pm

Well said Rich.

The Z's would certainly have lost in an attack at the camp on 12 coys and a battery. There would have been no open flanks or rear because there would have been a reserve of at least two and probably 3 coys. The Z's won on the 22nd for the absence of a reserve (and of course Col D's demand that he be supported in the plain when otherwise his 5 troops would have constituted a useful reserve).

But you may be giving the Lord C too much credence - if there was way of losing to the Z's he was good at finding it. Good job he wasn't attacked at Mangeni. But not even he could have botched defending the camp with his full force.

Hope you had a good trip and sorry not to be able to coincide in time and space.

Regards

Mike

Posted: Mon Oct 16, 2006 3:54 pm

OK! 1000 quid on the Lord for a win at Isandhlwana!!!!.. Wink

...
Yes, I would've enjoyed meeting you and Martin for a chat but our schedules couldn't mesh. Martin also was very very busy. I think he'd make a good politician with all that running around! Loved the museum. Glad I went to see the history! Martin has a fine setup there. Can't say enough about Wales, Ingalund and London! What places. We fit in just right. and they loved our accent. Er..I am not a Sheffield lad.... Wink

... Now too bad I can't keep traveling around. Besides the museum, also made my pilgrimage to St Paul's where Nelson and Wellington lay. Hey I'll stand alongside'em even if they're dead!... Wink

...

Posted: Mon Oct 16, 2006 5:29 pm

Mike

If the attack had taken place the following morning, would it have been at Mangeni ? As I don't think the Zulus would have attacked any additional force from Isandlwana heading to join him. Unless, Isandlwana remained as a staging(?) camp, between him and Rorke's Drift, meaning an even more depleted amount of defenders left to face 20,000 warriors.

Therefore, is there a chance, Durnford would still have been called to go to the Mangeni (as his orders seemed to suggest), his force leaving Isandlwana (without scouting the ridge) ahead of any of Pulleine's men (knowing Durnford), followed later by those ordered by Chelmsford to join him at his new camp.

So, Chelmsford where he was, Durnford's force going to join him, then later any additional force from Isandlwana ordered forward to also join him.

Am I making any sense ? Confused

Anyway, if the Zulus did attack Isandlwana the following morning, what sort of force would have been left, considering Durnford's No.2 Column and more from No.3 Column had departed ?

Or, had it been the Mangeni, any hints on the sort of defence Chelmsford would have created, as well as how the Zulu attack would have developed against him in this area ?

Man, I've got a headache now. If none of this makes any sort of sensible scenario, I'll delete it.

As I mentioned in another topic - some things sound okay in your head until you read what you wrote later. Eh? Confused

I give up, but I'll post this anyway Wink

Coll