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Posted: Mon Jul 02, 2007 4:17 pm

Dear All,
I've read in general works about Rorke's Drift how
Major Spalding departed the mission station to go to
Helpmakaar to seek reinforcements on 22nd January 1879.Is
such a departure classed as 'appropriate' for such a senior
rank.Would Major Spalding's decision to depart be classed
as flippant against the backdrop of a pending attack on
the mission station.How does his decision to return to
Helpmakaar under the assumption that the mission station
and men had been completely wiped out rank in terms of military
savvy.I haven't read anywhere that Major Spalding was
brought to account for these decisions.
Is this because the finger was pointed at Lord Chelmsford
for the events of the earlier encounter at Isandlwana and
Major Spalding's departures were overlooked.I can't
find any accounts of how Major Spalding's military career
progressed after the battle of Rorke's Drift.What is the
discussion forum contributor's assesment of Major Spalding.

Tony.

Posted: Mon Jul 02, 2007 9:50 pm

Tony

He was responsible for two places at once - Helpmekaar and R/Drift, so could reasonably be expected to be at either place at any one time, depending on requirements. He was presumably considerably irked - or at least mystified - as to why the company due at R/Drift a day or so earlier had still not materialised, despite repeated orders. Whether it was his job to go up the hill or send someone else instead is for a military man to explain, but I suspect the lack of action in response to the recent orders and the fact that he was responsible for both posts anyway decided matters for him.

As far as Spalding knew, there was no "backdrop of a pending attack at R/Drift" or anywhere else. Any action that day or on subsequent days would surely be further and further away from his posts as the days passed. (Which didn't exclude the need to fortify the supply post, as was pointed out shortly afterwards). If Chard had informed him of his concern about what he'd seen at Isandlwana earlier that morning (as he may or may not have done) perhaps he might (or might not) have acted differently.

The to-ing and fro-ing of Spalding, Rainforth and the two companies and changing of mind up and down the hill on the night of the 22nd is covered in several works. (From memory, I'm not sure that A Soldier Artist doesn't add further to the story with some newly published information, but can't check at present). They were given incorrect information more than once on the march and acted on it. Had they acted differently - or not rec'd the information - they may have been able to assist at R/Drift or they may have been caught in the open and defeated. Who knows?

I believe it is correct to say the odd rumour did begin to surface but it was scotched pretty quickly by Chelmsford and, as far as I know, no slur (certainly publicly) ever adhered to his reputation, as he was apparently mentioned in despatches for Isandlwana & R/Drift. Nor do I remember any reputable historian going along with these rumours.

Spalding apparently left the army in 1880.

Peter

Posted: Mon Jul 02, 2007 9:57 pm

Tony

My notes..............

SPALDING, Henry, brevet Major, 104th (Bengal Fusiliers) Regiment (1840-1907). Served as Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General during the Cape Frontier and Zulu campaigns. Born in St Pancras, London, he was commissioned into the army in 1858. He served during the Indian Mutiny attached to the 53rd Foot and was at the passage of Goomtee and occupation of Sultanpore (1858). He attended Junior Division Staff College in 1869 at a time when officers rarely undertook formal staff training. For his staff work during the Ninth Frontier War (1877-1878), he was appointed a brevet major. During the initial advance into Zululand by Lord Chelmsford�s force in January 1879, Spalding was responsible for the lines of communication between the force and the supply depots at Rorke�s Drift and Helpmekaar. His name was mentioned in the dispatches concerning the actions at Isandlwana and Rorke�s Drift. He retired from the army in 1880 with the honorary rank of lieutenant-colonel, and died in London.

Posted: Mon Jul 02, 2007 11:18 pm

Tony

There was indeed an enquiry, in early May, as to the reason for Spalding's decision to go up to Helpmekaar just a short time brfore the attack on Rorke's Drift. This is his reply:

"Capt. Rainforth�s Company 1/24th Reg�t was ordered from Helpmakaar for the purpose of taking up and entrenching a position commanding and defending the Ponts on the Buffalo R. I know of no other order touching the erection of a work for such a purpose. This Company should have been in the required position on the 20th Jan�y, the day of the departure of No. 3 Column from Rorke�s Drift for Isandhlwana. They did not arrive on that day nor even on the 21st. Seeing this, on the 22nd I rode over to Helpmakaar with a written order in my pocket directing Captain Rainforth positively to reach the ponts by sundown on that day. I met his Company together with that of Major Upcher of the same reg�t on their march down to Rorke�s Drift. I accompanied them. The intelligence of Isandhlwana met us on the way, as already mentioned in my report dated 25 January 1879 from Laager, Rorke�s Drift." (The National Archives, WO 32/7738).

KIS

Posted: Mon Jul 02, 2007 11:38 pm

Dear Peter,
thanks for the input.I think the impression
I have gained from the books I have read (most notably
'The Washing of the Spears'),is that 'the drift would
be in no immediate danger'.Would this assumption have
filtered through the lines of communication via Lord
Chelmsford,eventually to influnece Major Spalding's
comment 'nothing will happen and I will be back
before sunset'.Was perhaps the real reason for Major
Spalding's departure to ride to Helpmakaar to check
the whereabouts of the overdue arrival of the 1st/24th.

Dear Martin,
such enviable knowledge.If anything would
Major Spalding's biggest regret be that he wasn't present
at the defence of Rorke's Drift,despite his reputation
surviving intact?

Thanks Gentlemen.

Tony.

Posted: Tue Jul 03, 2007 8:56 am

Tony

Many (although not necessarily all) impressions gained from reading TWOTS (especially if picked up early in one's reading on the AZW) can, unfortunately, take a long time to eradicate - but, in many cases, eradicated they must be! If one thinks of Morris' offerings on the events of 22nd January in the same way that one would of the happenings and personalities portrayed in ZULU (a terrific read and a great film respectively but not to be confused with the real thing) and then move on to the more sound accounts, one will gradually leave TWOTS behind. This would apply even more so if, say, one's first exposure to the story of Isandlwana had been, heaven forbid, via the film Zulu Dawn.

That may be slightly harsh on Morris, especially as I haven't checked this morning to see what he said about Spalding, but in general I think it applies increasingly so. I'm sure you are right that the majority considered the Drift to be "in no immediate danger" once the column had moved away from the left bank on the 20th, and perhaps even more so when messages drifted back that morning to say that half the column had hurried even further on to invesigate a large Zulu force an addional dozen miles away. The feeling that the war was rapidly moving further away must have been inescapable for those on the Natal bank that week, especially with Durnford's force lately up at R/Drift from Middle Drift and that morning having left R/Drift to catch up with the 3rd Column, although the original caution against a Zulu incursion across the Buffalo or Tugela at any time would not have disappeared entirely, given the rough country between R/Drift and Middle Drift and even further SE (and given that their immediate local "protection" from the column itself, encamped on the left bank for over a week, had now disappeared, they were more exposed to attacks from an enemy "getting round the back" of the column, Isandlwana or no Isandlwana).

As far as the Drift being in no immediate danger during that morning or lunchtime, the same would have applied. Spalding's "nothing will happen" remark seems entirely plausible, and it was made only because he had had to establish seniority at the post before his departure. He was not to know that at that very moment the attack at Isandlwana was developing. After all, even when Smith, Reynolds and Witt, up on Shiyane, later gazed across at Zululand for ages, they were blissfully unaware that a major battle was being lost under their very noses and that their comrades were fleeing for their lives through the broken country they had in view.

Yes, Spalding's reason for going up to Helpmekaar was certainly to check on the reason for the non-appearance of the companies which should have arrived ages ago. He was at a loss to understand why they still hadn't come down and decided to sort it out once and for all himself. I have never heard of any other reason for his journey. Although intended to protect the post at the Drift, they were certainly not (at that time) seen as reinforcements for any specific forthcoming engagement at R/Drift. When the action did materialise, of course, they were anxiously awaited and at one time apparently got close enough to be expected very shortly.

The question of why the post had not been fortified before the 22nd and why the work on the ponts and a sangar had not been completed came up in correspondence between the Staff in the days following Isandlwana. This, and the various disagreements about defence arrangements at night on the left bank between the 12th and 20th illustrate the errors underlining the under-estimation the enemy.

Peter

Posted: Tue Jul 03, 2007 10:36 am

Tony

Major Spalding's actions regarding his return back to Helpmekaar and not continuing to Rorke's drift seem completely justified.
He had only received notice about Isandlwana when he encountered Major Upcher on the Helpmekaar-Rorke's drift road. The two companies of troops with Major Upcher were allowed to continue their advance while Major Spalding rode ahead of them to ascertain the situation. He encountered many Native troops and some civilians, all of whom had appeared to tell him that the drift had fallen. When he got within 2-3 miles of the drift he reported that :-

" On reaching the summit of the hill from which the mission house is visable, it was observed to be in flames, this confirmed the statements of the fugitives that the post had been captured"
Private Grant also reported seeing the smoke rising from the post.
In the gathering twilight, Zulus were seen on the hills ahead.

Would Major Spalding have been justified in advancing his two tired companies of troops in the dark, against an enemy of unknown numbers, risking the only reserve of trained soldiers available, just to recapture a post already ransacked and in flames ?
He acted wisely by accepting the apparent situation at Rorke's drift and returned to Helpmekaar to assist in the defence of that essential yet highly vunerable position.
His decisions taken at this time could not be tactically challenged, but hindsight could make it appear that he made the wrong choice.

Graham

Posted: Thu Jul 05, 2007 12:12 am

Dear Peter and Graham,
thanks for the further notes which expand on
the topic of Major Spalding.I am glad that I have at least managed to
'scratch the surface' in my undestanding of the Major's real reasons
for his departure to Helpmakaar,which was his genuine concern for
the safety of his men,without being swayed by those who suggest
that Major Spalding,may have left the drift for less worthy concerns.
I have gained the understanding that even such a notable work
as 'The Washing of the Spears' needs to have the outer
layers of generalisation peeled away by deeper research by
reference of primary source material,rather than acceptance
of secondary source material or personal interpretation.

Tony.

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2007 7:37 am

There is a degree of controversy, in my opinion, in the way that Spalding handled the situation.
It is clear that, on the morning of 22 January, Chard saw what everyone else at the camp at Isandlwana saw, namely great numbers of Zulu making an appearance on Nyoni Ridge or thereabouts. He also observed large numbers moving westwards behind Isandlwana, all this before Durnford's arrival. This immediately prompted him to leave the camp, something he may not have done if the sighting had not been evidenced. His concern was the security of the ponts. On the way back, as we know, he met Durnford and informed him accordingly. He then arrived back at RD and reported to Spalding. It seems not only improbable, but highly unlikely, that he failed to inform Spalding of a situatiuon, so serious, that he, Chard, had aborted his trip to return to look after the security of the ponts.
Now Spalding had already sent, (from memory,) two written instructions to Rainforth to move from Helpmekaar to RD. For whatever reason, Rainforth had not responded.
Here comes the crisp question. Spalding, on the balance of probability, was now aware of the Zulu threat. This balance of probability being reinforced by Spalding's decision to leave RD immediately to personally get a grip of Rainforth. He also knew that the Zulus could reach RD before he could get to Helpmekaar and back. So why did he not, in view of the potential Zulu threat, send yet another written instruction. This time by a senior mounted individual with escort, to summons Rainforth? To undertake the task himself under the circumstances outlined, (no matter that Chelmsford subsequently 'whitewashed' him) raises questions.
Just a thought.

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2007 9:33 am

Peter,
I do not appear to have arrival date/time for Rainforth (G Coy) at Helpmekeer. However the company left Greytown on 10 Jan. Upcher (D Coy) arrived at Greytown on 16 Jan and then arrived at Helpmekaar on 21 Jan (I could probably refine arrival/departure timing by consulting Heaton). So I assume Rainforth was at Helpmekaar by 16 Jan.

The 1st Battalion digest gives the following entry for 22 Jan 79....

G Company (Captain T Rainforth) received orders to proceed to Rorke�s Drift. At about 2.30 pm when the company was mid-way between Helpmakaar and Rorke�s Drift fugitives from Isandhlwana were met with the news that the camp had been taken. G Company was halted and was later joined by D Company. Both were determined to push on the Rorke�s Drift as fast as possible. When four miles from the drift, men from the Colonial Mounted Infantry reported that Rorke�s Drift had fallen. Major Spalding who had joined the party rode forward to reconnoitred and reported that Rorke�s Drift was in flames. Colonel Hassard (Royal Engineers) ordered the party to fall back and protect the stores at Helpmakaar. Helpmakaar was reached at 11.30 pm and formed a laager together with 30 men who had escaped from Isandlwana.

The RD roof was set on fire at about 6pm. So when did Rainforth receive orders - must be at least 8 am on 22 January?

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2007 12:06 pm

Martin,
Assuming that Rainforth arrived at Helpmekaar on or about 16 January, he had then purportedly received two written instructions from Spalding prior to 22 January to advance to RD. For some reason,he either did not receive these instructions or did not respond, but remained at Helpmekaar. So we are not presumably dealing with these instructions, rather the issue on Spalding's timings, together with Spalding giving fresh instructions to Rainforth on arrival at Helpmekaar.
Chard got back to RD plus/minus 1130 hrs. Having briefed Spalding, the latter took off pretty quickly for Helpmekaar, say plus/minus 1200 hrs.
RD to Helpmekaar is, on the original road, approximately 15 miles. Assuming that Spalding is mounted, it would take him approximately two hours to reach Helpmekaar, i.e. 1400 hrs. So the timings reflected in the 1st Battalion digest are perhaps open to question? Unless Rainforth was acting under one of the previous orders sent by Spalding?
Either way, I do not see how Rainforth could have received his orders, delivered by Spalding, at 0800 hrs 22 January.
Ron Lock has walked the old route from Helpmekaar to RD and estimates the time taken by unencumered troops marching at a quick pace to be under four hours. So there seems to be a timings 'mystery.'

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2007 12:25 pm

Peter,

I assume that Rainforth's primary task was to guard Helpmekaar. Upcher according to Heaton arrives the stores depot at 6 pm (21 Jan) - with less than one hour's light remaining. If Rainforth had orders by that stage - he would have decided to set off at first light next day (22 Jan) leaving D Coy to guard the stores depot - again both companies were 'self-contained' - so Rainforth may have delayed his start in order to pack the tentage.

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2007 2:20 pm

Martin,
Reading your first posting, it would seem on balance that Rainforth was acting on a previous order to move to RD, sent on the 21st. Hence his ETD Helpmekaar, would be approximately 1230 hrs on the basis of packing tents etc. Two hours later he would be at approximately mid-way between RD and H, which is when Spalding met them having left RD at 1330 hrs. That is assuming that the 1430 time is correct. This leaves the question that 1330 hrs seems to be a tad late for Spalding to have left RD as opposed to the 1200 hrs suggested in my previous posting? And yes, his initial task would have been the defence of Helpmekaar. Timing still not quite gelling?

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2007 2:48 pm

Peter,
Sorry this is piecemeal.........

Heaton's entry for 22 January...

Orders came in for Rainforth�s Coy to leave as well as ours. Col Hassard and Baxter came in for breakfast All goods bar light field kit and one blanket gone with stores. A lot of canteen stores for both Batts came in made arrangements to forward them to the drift. Rainforth�s Coy left at 2.30 ours just after 3. Met Spalding outside after him any number of mounted men flying from the camp at Col Glyn�s column which the Zulus had cut up. Got orders to retire on Helpmakaar got in about 11.

The timing in the digest appears wrong.
'Met Spanding outside' does not suggest that it was halfway on the road to RD. However the decision to turn around and go back may been between 6-7pm.

Posted: Fri Jul 06, 2007 3:10 pm

Martin,
All timings given obviously have to recognised as approximate. For example, Heaton's entry, " Ours [left H] just after three. Met Spalding outside after him any amount of mounted men flying from the camp ..."
To get from Isandlwana to Helpmekaar (uphill from RD) would take the best part of four hours. Which means that the ' any amount of mounted men' would have left Isandlwana at approx. 1100hrs. Not possible- too early.
However, none of this deviates from the original point of Spalding's departure from RD to summons Rainforth.