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Date	Original Topic
26th January 2003	Durnford: Villain or hero? By Mark Hobson I was wondering what peoples views were on Durnford and whether or not he deserved Chelmsford's wrath? The fact that he would be made scapegoat - along with, to a lesser extent, Pulleine - became clear in the hours and days following Isandlwana. It is pretty much accepted that Chelmsford set out to shift the blame from his own shoulders onto those of people no longer in a position to defend themselves; those senior officers who perished. Yet the debate won't go away. Durnford had a complex personality. He was a naturally humanitarian person who sympathised with the peoples of South Africa, he was also, paradoxically, a man driven to prove his leadership qualities. Ever since his humiliation in 1873 he was left with the burning question whether he had the ability to command. And not only did he need to prove this to himself, but also to colonial society who held him responsible for the failure at Bushman's Pass, for which they nicknamed him 'Don't Fire Durnford'. At Isandlwana he had a chance to put this right. Some would say at any cost, and that he had a death wish. There is no doubting his personal bravery, but in the heat of battle some of the survivors hint that he may have 'lost it', exposing himself to needless risks even when the battle was still young. He had opportunities to escape, maybe with Lt's Henderson or Davis, or Simeon Kambule who all lived to tell the tale. Instead he chose to stay and fight, a decision which cost him his life but allowed others to survive. Yet I don't believe it was a death wish, rather a question of sdalvaging his honour. He wanted above all to prove his worth and to have Bushman's Pass and all it entailed set5 aside. In my opinion he did salvage his honour. After all, when all was lost at Isandlwana those very people who had pointed the finger of blame in '73, the fighting men of colonial society, rallied around him. It was Durnford whom they chose to spend their final moments with. It's my view that he did find a kind of redemption on January 22nd. And still is to this day
Date	Replies
28th January 2003	John Young Mark, You may well be right, perhaps Isandlwana was Durnford's atonement. The following words from a contemporary, Sir Henry Evelyn Wood, V.C. are worthy, in my opinion of note: "...Yet surely no greater proof of devoted steadiness was ever given than that shown by the Natal Carbineers on January 22nd, 1879. Imagine a gentle slope up which is storming a resistless, surging wave of encircling black bodies, which, though constantly smitten with laden hail, breaks but to sweep on combatants and friendly natives flying through the already burning camp, and pressing on to the rapidly narrowing outlet over the fatal Nek. Then there comes on the scene a one-armed man, who, having slowly fallen back before the ever-increasing foe, is now determined to die. 'Save yourself. As for me, I shall remain.' He thus dismisses a Staff Officer and Hlubi's black soldiers, who vainly urge the great chief to seek safety with them. Recognising his commanding courage, around him gather some twenty similar spirits, who nobly disdaining death, resolve to cover the retreat of the guns and die with him. That melancholy field of Insandwhlana has a record in silence and death of what Colonists did, but none th less a living record, now and for ever. In the place where Durnford fell there was a heap of slain; the enemy lay thick about him; but your sons were so close, and the brave hearts of the best of your fighting men ceased to beat in the effort to shelter their elected heroic leader. He himself was fully worthy their devotion, and History will narrate the ring of dead white men that encrcled him formed a halo round his and their renown." (Original spelling and grammar retained. JY) This speech was given to a deputation from Natal, at Chatham, in 1882. In a few short words Wood encompasses many things. John Young, R.Z.W.S.
28th January 2003	Ian Essex On the other hand had he not left Puelleine in charge and stayed (as he was instructed to do?) things may have been different? Also... had he not settled into the donga (to fight the left horn) when he had the opportunity to get back to the main camp (Durnfords troop was mounted) things may have been slightly different. As an experienced soldier (Puelleine being the pen pusher) Durnford may have had a slightly better 'battle head' to address the situation in the short space of time they had left?
29th January 2003	Bill Cainan Ian "Stayed - as he was Instructed to do" ?? This point has probably been discussed to death on this site ! I believe (as do many others) that Durnford clearly saw his orders as being instructions to move from Rorke's Drift to Isandlwana to support Chelmsford. The intepretation of the early Zulu moves left him in no doubt that Chelmsford's rear was being threatened and that it was his duty to protect the General. As his column contained a large force of cavalry he was the only person to be in a position to be able to actively support Chelmsford. Only on coming into contact with the Zulu left horn did he appreciated the enormity of what was happening. He must have realised at that point that the best service he could provide for Pulleine was to stop the advance of the left horn. His stubborn defence of the donga went a long way to achieving this - but he had only limited ammunition with him. The failure of his Lieutenants to find his own ammunition waggon (coming up slowly from Rorke's Drift) put paid to his defence of the donga and ultimately led to the collapse of the firing line. Pulleine had set up his firing line in accordance with Chelmsford's orders and was effectively holding the Zulu centre, but his flanks were vulnerable. To achieve success, the horns of the Zulu army had to be kept in check and prevented from turning the flanks of the line, which would cut the Companiies off from their ammunition waggons. Had Durnford remained in the camp I would suggest that there was little more he could have done, not withstanding his greater experience. The ammunition waggons at the camp were too spread out to be included in a large redcoated square, which is really what the British needed to do to hope to fight off the Zulu Army (a square has no flanks to be turned, and the vulnerable and essential ammunition waggons would be fully protected by being within the square). Durnford would have inherited the camp layout. would have been unfamiliar with commanding the Companies of the 24th and would always have been trying to second guess the Zulus who had clearly seized and maintained the initiative. Isandlwana was lost to the British because of initial British arrogance, poor intelligence, and superior Zulu tactics. Once the Zulus had achieved the intial surprise, they had the initiative which they were not to loose. For the British, it was a case of damage limitation. Durnford fully played his part in this, and those that did survive must in no small way owe their survival to him. On another point, how much was Chelmsford directly responsible for making Durnford the scapegoat? I am coming to believe that Chelmsford had a very loyal staff (esp Crealock) who did everything they could to defend the reputation of their leader. Once the intial accusations had been made, there was no going back and Chelmsford had been comnmitted by his "well meaning" (?) staff officers. And it must be said that Chelmsford had learned his lesson from Isandlwana - he certainly got it "right" at Gingdhlovu and at Ulundi !! Finally, a big thank you to UK History for putting on their Anglo-Zulu War trilogy last week. It was a well crafted overview which put everything into a proper context. Bill
29th January 2003	Mark Hobson Chelmsford did indeed learn his lesson, but despite his ultimate triumph at Ulundi this was inevitably allways going to be overshadowed by Isandlwana. One thing has to be said, of which me and Bill discussed many times over a cold beer at the Isandlwana Lodge, was that Chelmsford was quick to recover his wits. Inspite of his shock and disbelief he immediately set about organising the defences along the Natal border, putting aside his failure and concentrating instead on reducing the "perceived" threat to the colony. It is a mark of his levels of recovery that he was able to do so with great speed. Of course, we all know now that Cetshwayo never had any real intention of invading Natal, and that the Zulu army was too badly hurt to do so, but on the days following the 22nd Chelmsford and the frightened citizens along the border weren't to know that.
29th January 2003	Melvin Hunt I am always amazed that successive writers describe how vulnerable the Natal border was to Zulu invasion immediately after Isandlwana. I think it was just as vulnerable before the battle. Surely the Zulu army was so mobile that it could have simply bypassed Isandlwana without a fight to invade into Natal if it had wished to do so?
30th January 2003	Clive Dickens Melvin You are dead right mate, the Zulu nation never at any time had aqny intention of invading Natal, in my own opinion the onl reason and the main one at that for Prince Dabulmanzi to ignore K
30th January 2003	Clive Dickens I will start again mu computer is playing tricks again. Melvin You are dead right mate ,the Zulu nation never at any time had any intention of invading Natal, in my own opinion the only reason and the main one at that for Prince Dabulmanzi to cross the border to Rorkes Drift and ignoring King Cetsywayo intructions was to regain the cattlle that had been taken by the British forces in the week running up to Isandlwana. I do not think that any time their thoughts had been to capture and occupy land but onl to defend their own. Clive
30th January 2003	Julian Whybra 'As he was instructed to do' - this is indeed a moot point. I pointed out in my Durnford Papers article that the order to Durnford stated that he was 'to march to this camp' and later the phrase 'to move up here (Nangwane valley)' is used by which Crealock meant Mangeni valley. Taken with previous orders i wonder how Durnford interpreted this order upon receipt. Could confusion have arisen in Durnford's mind over where was 'here'? Was 'the camp' the one at Isandhlwana or the new camp on the Mangeni? It may be that he saw Bengough's and his move to the Mangeni as two arms of a pincer move in support of Chelmsford's advance. This may explain Durnford's words and reasoning on the 22nd and why he stated that he would not be remaining in camp. He clearly thought he had somewhere else to go. Although Crealock later wrote that he intended Mangeni to be read for Nangwane, there are at least 4 other river valleys in close proximity to Isandhlwana with names closer to Nangwane than Mangeni - perhaps Durnford thought he'd been ordered to the Ngwebeni, the Nondweni, the Ndweni or the Nxobongo. I hope Bush has good Arabic translators.
30th January 2003	Mark Hobson To add to the mystery regarding Durnford's precise orders, and whether he was to take charge of the camp, the following is part of a letter written by Lt Colonel Luard RE regarding the orders which were subsequently "found" and passed on. He says 'Prior to the 22nd January 1879 Colonel Durnford recieved certain orders, & though it was stated soon afterwards & repeated by Lord Chelmsford on the 18th August & again on the 2nd September 1880 in the House of Lords that Colonel Durnford had received orders to take charge of the camp at Isandlwana, it subsequently transpired from Colonel Crealock... that Durnford had not received orders to take charge of the camp. It must be apparant to any military man that it never could have been intended that he should have assumed that charge, being at the time in independent command of another column of the army, more especially as not a word appears to have said, either to Colonel Glyn whose camp it was, or to Colonel Pulleine who was left in temporary charge of it, that such a change of command was contemplated.' The point concerning the fact that Durnford was in charge of No 2 Column, which had been ordered up to operate with No 3 Column, is valid. And besides, the camp was soon due to be moved forward towards Mangeni, a point Durnford would have known, further adding to his impression that he was to help with Chelmsfords sweep to the east.
30th January 2003	Peter Ewart And we mustn't forget that just ONE WEEK previously, the day following the invasion, Durnford had had his b...s chewed off in no uncertain manner in that message from Chelmsford: "Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command ... I trust you will understand this plain speaking & not give me any further occasion to write in a style which is distasteful to me." Chelmsford naturally wanted his orders obeyed and would have no truck with loose canons trying to jump the gun - otherwise Durnford would not come to the party. Now, impulsive and headstrong Durnford may sometimes have been, and a man who clearly possessed the courage of his convictions - but we know from his correspondence that this "put-down" hit home. Was he really even remotely likely to do anything which he knew full well in advance would make his removal inevitable? Surely, at that particular time of all times, when he'd finally received the order to join the rest of them in Zululand, he would do everything in his power to adhere strictly to any instructions received from the General himself? As far as I can see - and setting aside the subsequent claims of the Staff - Durnford was attempting to obey his (vague?) orders to the letter, ambiguous as they were and difficult as that became. Peter
31st January 2003	Peter Ewart For "one week", of course, read "one week & a little bit" - just for accuracy's sake! PE
2nd February 2003	Trevor Finney I think Durnford was incompatent at Isandlwana. I beleive they were outnumbered 5 to 1 by the Zulu at this battle. Yet at R.D they were outnumbered 40 to 1. But still made a much better show of it. I know RD was a more defencive, enclosed battle. Against the open plains battle of Isandlwana. But Durnfords tactics were criminal. To spread his forces out in such a way that concentrated compact fire was not effective. Shows his lack of thoughtful planning. Lets face it. He gave the wrong orders that cost the lives of almost all of his men! The "Buck" has to stop with Durnford. Villian!
2nd February 2003	Bill Cainan Trevor As a confirmed Durnford admirer. I must take issue with your statement that Durnford's tactics were "criminal" and that his tropp dispositions showed "his lack of thoughtful planning", culminating in the "incompetent" assessment. What exactly do you base this assessment on ? At the donga, Durnford had some 200 troopers, who probably had about fifty rounds each for their carbines. Facing him was the Zulu left horn of between 5,000 and 9,000 warriors (the iNgobamkhosi and uVe Regiments). I would contend that his disposition WERE very effective. Mehlokazulu of the iNgobamakhosi stated, for example, "We could not advance against their fire any longer .... they fired so heavily that we had to retire" (see Jackson's "Hill of the Sphinx" page 35). In addition, Durnford arranged for artillery support from one of the two 7pdr guns. The importance of holding the position also led to Pope's Company being sent to support him. The problem that Durnford faced was logistic rather than tactical - that of ammunition resupply. Where was Durnford's reserve ammunition waggon ? Somewhere on the road from Rorke's Drift - had it even reached the neck ? Durnford's attempts to resupply are well documented, including the refusal by the 24th's Quartermasters (rightly or wrongly ?). Ultimately, with his ammunition running low, and with no possibility of resupply, Durnford had no choice but to withdraw from the donga. The Zulus were also starting to flank his position to the south. This was to prove the beginning of the collapse of the British line - but what else could Durnford have done ? As to Durnford losing "almost all of his men", well..... did he really ? You need to look at the list of survivors ! Durnford ordered his Native Horse from the battlefield and they pretty well sucessfully cut their way through the Zulus. Who do you think provided the initial cavalry screen around Rorke's Drift ? Durnford, for whatever reason, decided personally to stay on the battlefield, and certainly motivated survivors of the Colonial cavalry to make a last stand with him, which again prevented (for a while) the horns from closing, allowing others to escape. I don't think you can directly compare the situation at Rorke's Drift with that at Isandlwana - the circumstances were very different in each location. Well Trevor, there you have it - my defence of Durnford. Come back and try to convince me of his incompetence ! Good luck Bill
25th March 2003	barry tookey re durnford have alook at the report at RE chatham , theres a question mark over wether orders ? were removed from the body
9th July 2003	Simon Copley If Isandlwhana was Durnford's redemption for his earlier failures then Ulundi was Chelmsford's for Isandlwhana. Chelmsford should have stepped down to let Wolsey take over but he pressed on with his offensive at Ulundi. Why? Because he knew that he, in his turn, had a redeeming work to do; because he, not Durnford, was responsible for the Isandlwhana debacle. Durnford had an independent command and the camp was in the charge of Pulleine on Chelmsford's orders. Nothing Durnford could have done would have saved the camp because it had not been laagered and Chelmsford knew this. In fact Durnford did more than anyone to save the situation and many lives. It was Chelmsford's faulty reading of the Zulu movements that allowed the main Zulu army to get within striking distance of the camp. In fact, he committed a cardinal error, dividing his already tiny command in the presence of a vastly numerically superior and more mobile enemy when he didn't even know where they were! A bit like Custer at Little Big Horn. Durnford was a bally hero!
17th July 2003	Peter Young As an aside, I am reading (again) Frank Emery's book "The Red Soldier". In this a letter is reprinted, written at Rorke's Drift on or around the 28/29 January, which repeats a rumour that Durnford had committed suicide at the height of the battle. So he really was getting bad press a matter of days after his death. I do not have the excerpt to hand but will root it out if anyone is interested. Also the Droogleever book "The Road to Isandhlwana" gives some interesting insights into Durnford's knowledge of the Zulu and other tribes. I too am an admirer of the man. Peter
1st June 2005	Coll All As the recent topic covering the discovery of the Zulu army is being discussed at length (113 replies so far), there were a couple of points that caused me to involve myself in it. Col. Durnford was included in that discussion, and being an admirer of the man, I wanted to see what others thought about him, after reading this and other topics which mentioned several issues concerning him. Has anyone changed their opinion of him in any way, good or bad ? I didn't want to start a new topic about Durnford, as this one does contain many views, so I thought it would be interesting to re-activate it and see what happens. Peter Y I'm sure I read about that rumour as well somewhere. Coll
2nd June 2005	Keith Smith The reference to Durnford's supposed suicide is made in Frank Emery, The Red Soldier, on p. 103. Emery, in a footnote on the same page, gives no currency to the rumour.
2nd June 2005	Michael Boyle The footnote also mentions that the same story was applied to Pulliene. That's the only place I've seen it as well, anyone aware of any other references? Even on the face of it, it would seem absurd and apparently died a quick death as a result. I only wonder who started it and why?
2nd June 2005	Coll Keith and Michael This is why I re-introduced both of these topics about Durnford and his actions. It would be another chance to dismiss any of the rumours about him or his actions, which may affect people's opinion of him. It would also be a good opportunity to strengthen, in a positive way, what he actually was like, the decisions he made and his role in the battle at Isandlwana. Coll